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503 
SELL-ING YOUR SOUL TO THE COURTS: FORCED 
MEDICATION TO ACHIEVE TRIAL COMPETENCY IN THE 
WAKE OF SELL V. UNITED STATES.1 
“Could you send your guy out there with a needle the day before the 
trial . . . so that he behaves the way the government wants him to at 
trial?”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
How far are we willing to go to prosecute a criminal defendant?3  
Sell v. United States is the most recent Supreme Court decision on the 
issue of forced medication for mentally ill defendants that addresses this 
very question.4  The Sell Court faced two important, yet very different 
legal issues.5  First, the Court had to determine procedurally whether it 
had jurisdiction over an appeal of a non-final order.6  Second, the Court 
had to decide whether the Constitution permits the government to 
administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal 
defendant charged with serious, yet nonviolent, crimes solely for trial 
competency purposes.7 
 
 1. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that the appellate court was wrong to 
approve forced medication solely to render defendant competent to stand trial). 
 2. Transcript of Oral Argument, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), 
available in 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 21, at 28 (Mar. 3, 2003) (question posed by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy). 
 3. See Brief of Petitioner at 35, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) 
[hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].  “[T]his Court has never before allowed an intrusion this invasive 
solely for prosecutorial purposes.”  Id.  Attorneys for the Petitioner explain the Sell problem best as 
“[t]he government wants to medicate Dr. Sell because it hopes that doing so will bring Dr. Sell into 
an artificially induced, drug-dependant competence, so that the government can bring him to trial on 
charges involving alleged economic crimes of fraud and money laundering.” Id. at 23 (emphasis in 
original). 
 4. Sell, 539 U.S. 166. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 175. 
 7. Id. at 169.  See also Warren Richey, Forced medication: When does it violate rights?, 
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (March 3, 2003), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
2003/0303/p01s02-usju.html.  Richey articulates that one of the main concerns of the justices in the 
Sell Court was to determine whether the government’s interest in prosecuting Dr. Sell outweighed 
Sell’s interest in being free from forced medication.  Id. 
1
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Sell involves issues of individual liberty that reach beyond the 
sphere of the mentally ill.8  Although the Court ultimately decided in Dr. 
Sell’s favor by applying the facts of the case to a heightened scrutiny 
test, the Court missed an opportunity to decide this case on broader, 
more protective constitutional grounds for other mentally ill defendants.9 
This Note considers the effect that the decision in Sell v. United 
States has on mentally ill criminal defendants in both procedural and 
substantive arenas.10  Section II gives a brief introduction to the 
collateral order doctrine and discusses forced medication for trial 
competency purposes.11  Section III provides the statement of facts, the 
procedural history and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sell.12  Section 
IV analyzes the Court’s decision in Sell and examines why the Court 
was correct in categorizing forced medication decisions under the 
collateral order doctrine.13  It further discusses why the Court should 
have applied strict scrutiny to the issue of forced medication in order to 
protect Dr. Sell’s constitutional rights.14  Section IV also discusses 
specific problems with the heightened scrutiny test laid out by the 
Court.15  Finally, Section V concludes the Note by reiterating the 
importance of strict, prompt review of important right violations such as 
in the field of forced medication.16 
 
 8. Richey, supra note 7, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0303/p01s02-usju.html.  Richey 
explains: 
The case holds major implications for individual liberty, should the justices grant the 
government broad powers to overrule personal decisions rejecting medical treatment. It 
could, for example, enable local boards of education to force problem schoolchildren to 
take Ritalin as a condition of attending public school, or empower health officials to 
mandate blanket anthrax vaccinations regardless of personal objections. 
Id. 
 9. See infra notes 158-99 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 232-40 and 
accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Parts II-IV. 
 11. See infra notes 17-73 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 74-126 and accompanying text.  The Procedural History and Statement of 
the Facts are combined in this Note due to the fact that the procedure intertwines with the important 
factual aspects of the case. 
 13. See infra notes 127-241 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 127-241 and accompanying text.  See also Center for Cognitive Liberty 
Ethics, U.S. Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Forced-Drugging Case: Does the Constitution 
Forbid Forcibly Drugging an Arrestee to Make Him Competent to Stand Trial?  Justices Examine 
the Intersection of Freedom of Thought With New Mind-Altering Drugs (March 3, 2003), available 
at http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/news/Sell_Oral_Arguments.html.  “Backed by a number of civil 
liberties organizations, Dr. Sell’s lawyers told the Court that their client’s right to bodily and mental 
integrity was guaranteed under the First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.”  Id. 
 15. See infra notes 200-31 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Collateral Order Doctrine 
The Court’s struggle over the jurisdiction issue in Sell v. United 
States17 starts with the collateral order doctrine.18  In 1949, the United 
States Supreme Court created the collateral order doctrine of federal 
appellate jurisdiction.19 
1.  The Final Judgment Rule 
Collateral order is a practical construction20 of the final judgment 
rule21 of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.22  More specifically, the collateral order 
doctrine permits appeals from decisions that finally determine claims too 
important to deny review.23  The collateral issue must also be too 
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be 
 
 17. Sell, 539 U.S. at 166, syllabus point 1. 
 18. “Collateral order doctrine” is defined as “[a] doctrine allowing appeal from an 
interlocutory order that conclusively determines an issue wholly separate from the merits of the 
action and effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
256 (7th ed. 1999).  Collateral order is also termed the Cohen doctrine, from Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (upholding the right to appeal from an order refusing to 
direct the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action to comply with a state statute requiring the 
posting of security for costs).  Id. 
 19. Cohen, 337 U.S. 541. 
 20. Id. at 546. 
 21. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (refusal to enforce 
a settlement agreement that was claimed to shelter the parties from breach of contract did not supply 
the basis for immediate appeal).  The final judgment rule allows appeals only after all the issues 
involved in a particular lawsuit have been finally determined by the court.  JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, 
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.1 (3d ed. 1999).  A final decision is ordinarily a final judgment 
which “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.”  Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (dismissing a motion to vacate and 
dismissing an order of condemnation of lands for military purposes are not final decisions 
warranting appeal).  In criminal cases, this prohibits appellate review until after conviction and 
imposition of sentence.  Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (holding that a pretrial 
disqualification of criminal defense counsel is not immediately appealable).  See also Berman v. 
United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (holding that determination of a sentence in a criminal case 
is a final judgment). 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) reads: 
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 
the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the 
District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a 
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. 
Id. 
 23. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 
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deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.24  As courts cling to the 
policy behind the final judgment rule, they apply collateral order in only 
a small number of cases.25  In the federal system, a litigant may only 
take an appeal outside of “final decision” in exceptional circumstances.26 
2.  The Birth of Collateral Order 
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,27 the Supreme Court 
interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the statute that sets out appellate court 
jurisdiction.28  The Court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1292 allows appeals 
from certain interlocutory orders, decrees and judgments.29  Due to the 
 
 24. Id.  For examples of too much independence, see also United States v. River Rouge Co., 
269 U.S. 411, 414 (1926) (holding that a distinct controversy over gas lines had such finality and 
completeness that it may be reviewed under this writ of error as it had no bearing on the larger issue 
of land awards) and Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940) (explaining that 
“finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.  It was 
written into the first Judiciary Act and has been departed from only when observance of it would 
practically defeat the right to any review at all”). 
 25. See Lloyd Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four 
Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L.REV. 539, 542 (1998) (noting the four policies for the finality of 
judgment rule).  According to Anderson: 
First, [the final judgment rule] protects the authority of trial judges by forbidding 
piecemeal appeals of pretrial orders that would make a judge’s every ruling subject to 
immediate intervention by an appellate tribunal.  Second, it protects the appellate courts 
from the intolerable burden of conducting immediate review of countless pretrial orders.  
Third, the final judgment rule protects litigants with meritorious claims and defenses 
from the harassment and expense of multiple appeals by an adversary keen to avoid a 
decision on the merits.  Fourth, it protects society’s interest in having a legal system that 
resolves lawsuits as quickly and cheaply as possible. 
Id. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000).  See also Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, 
Discretionary Appellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It’s Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 288-89 (1999) (suggesting that the current appellate system should be 
replaced with one in which the decision on whether to allow an interlocutory appeal in a civil case is 
left to the sound discretion of the courts of appeals), stating: 
Congress has . . . expressly provided for an appeal as of right from orders granting, 
continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions (whether preliminary or 
otherwise); from certain orders relating to receivers and receiverships; from certain 
interlocutory decrees in admiralty cases; and from certain orders in arbitration cases.  In 
addition, the Supreme Court in Rule 54(b) . . . has allowed appeals in cases in which 
there are multiple claims or multiple parties, and the district court enters a separate 
judgment as to one or more, but less than all, of the claims and/or parties and expressly 
determines that “there is no just reason for delay . . . for the entry of the judgment.” 
Id. 
 27. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 541. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1291, supra note 22. 
 29. 28 U.S.C.  § 1292.  For example, in §1292(a), interlocutory appeals are permitted in, but 
not limited to, the following: 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals 
4
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significance of some issues which are not necessarily final on the merits, 
yet final and separate from the underlying question at hand, the Supreme 
Court gave a practical rather than technical construction of 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.30  The Court in Cohen decided that decisions “which finally 
determine claims of right separate from and collateral to rights asserted 
in the action” are too important to deny review. 31  The Court explained 
that these issues are “too independent of the cause itself to require that 
appellate jurisdiction be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated,” 
even though they do not end the litigation on the merits.32  
The Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay33 formulated 
a stringent test in line with Cohen, requiring that collateral orders must: 
(1) be completely separate from the merits of the case;34 (2) not be 
 
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of 
the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the 
District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges 
thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing 
to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the 
Supreme Court; (2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind 
up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing 
sales or other disposals of property; (3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or 
the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases 
in which appeals from final decrees are allowed. 
Id. 
 30. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (noting the need for the collateral order doctrine). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978) (holding an order denying 
class certification is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine). 
 34. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3911, at 333 
(2d ed. 1992).   
The requirement that the matter be separate from the merits of the action itself means 
that review now is less likely to force the appellate court to consider approximately the 
same (or a very similar) matter more than once, and also seems less likely to delay trial 
court proceedings (for, if the matter is truly collateral, those proceedings might continue 
while the appeal is pending). 
Id. at 333-34 (emphasis in original).  See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (holding an 
attorney general immune from suit for authorization of warrantless domestic security wiretap prior 
to a decision clearly establishing the unconstitutionality of such a wiretap).  The Court found 
qualified immunity to be completely separate from the merits of the action, because a claim of 
immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that his rights have been 
violated.  Id. at 527-28. 
        This “conceptual distinctness” made the immediately appealable issue “separate” from the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim, in part because 
[a]n appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant’s claim of immunity need not 
consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts, nor even determine 
whether the plaintiff’s allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a 
question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were 
clearly established at the time of the challenged actions or, in cases where the district 
5
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tentative, informal or incomplete, but conclusively determine the 
disputed question;35 and (3) effectively unreviewable36 on appeal from a 
final judgment.37  Due to the stringent requirements of the doctrine, it is 
easy to see how courts confine the doctrine to very narrow 
circumstances and use it in relatively few cases.38 
 
court has denied summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that even under the 
defendant’s version of the facts the defendant’s conduct violated clearly established law, 
whether the law clearly proscribed the actions the defendant claims he took. 
Id. at 528 (footnote omitted).  An important issue completely separate from the merits of the case 
can be something such as a procedural or evidentiary question.  See, e.g., Exxon Chems. Am. v. 
Chao, 298 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the administrative review board’s remand order 
was not a final agency action because it did not issue a decision definitively resolving the merits of 
the case).  For example, discovery activity is typically related to the merits of the underlying 
litigation, but sanctioning instead is related to the district court’s perception, wholly collateral to the 
merits of the case.  Gross v. G.D. Searle & Co., 738 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that an 
order determining that the plaintiff had to comply with a subpoena was not an appealable order) 
(citing DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
 35. WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 333.  The requirement that the district court’s order 
“conclusively determine” the question means that appellate review is likely needed to avoid that 
harm.  Id. 
 36. The general rule is that an order is effectively unreviewable only where the order at issue 
involves “an asserted right, the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not 
vindicated before trial.”  Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (holding 
that a denial of a motion to dismiss indictment was not immediately appealable) (quoting United 
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)).  The chance that a decision may be erroneous and 
may “impose additional litigation expense is not sufficient to set aside the finality requirement in 28 
U.S.C.S. § 1291.”  Id.  The Supreme Court has held in cases involving criminal prosecutions that 
“the deprivation of a right not to be tried is effectively unreviewable after final judgment and is 
immediately appealable.”  Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989) (holding that 
denial of motion to dismiss on the basis of a contractual forum-selection clause was not immediately 
appealable) (citing Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (denial of motion to dismiss under the 
Speech or Debate Clause) and Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (denial of motion to 
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds)).  See Anderson, supra note 25, at 615 n.407 (comparing 
Midland Asphalt Corp., 489 U.S. at 801 to Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 500 which declined to hold the 
collateral order doctrine applicable where a district court has denied a claim, not that the defendant 
has a right not to be sued at all, but that the suit against the defendant is not properly before the 
particular court because it lacks jurisdiction). 
 37. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.  See Anderson, supra note 25, at 542.  Courts have 
interpreted the Cohen case in different ways.  Id. at 556.  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 
156 (1974) (allowing review of the issue of class action because the matter was collateral to the 
merits of the case), interpreted Cohen as having only two prongs, leaving out the third 
unreviewability prong.  Id. at 555.  In Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), the Court 
interpreted Cohen as setting forth three requirements, not two.  Id. at 556. 
 38. See Jack W. Pirozzolo, The States Can Wait: The Immediate Appealability of Orders 
Denying Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1617, 1620-22 (1992) (discussing 
policies behind Cohen and the small number of cases that fall under the Cohen holding).  The 
Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of the finality requirement “is to combine in one review 
all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final 
judgment results.”  Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 
6
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3.  Limited Application of the Collateral Order Doctrine 
The purpose of the “collateral order doctrine” is to provide review 
of an issue that would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.39  An order is collateral and therefore appealable if it 
“involves an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would 
be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.”40  However, even if 
the issue is collateral, factual issues in dispute and necessary for 
determination of the question may still block the possibility of appeal.41 
Since Cohen, the Supreme Court has only found three prejudgment 
orders in criminal cases appealable.42  These prejudgment orders include 
denials of motions to reduce bail,43 denials of motions to dismiss on 
double jeopardy grounds,44 and denials of motions to dismiss under the 
 
 39. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 21, at § 13.2. 
 40. Keri L. Bowles, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: II. Preliminary 
Proceedings: Grand Jury, 90 GEO. L.J. 1305, 1334 (2002) (discussing collateral order and criminal 
defendants).  In Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 798, the Court noted that, as a general policy, only 
final judgments of the federal district courts may be reviewed on appeal.  Id. at 798.  In criminal 
cases, final judgment does not occur until a defendant has been convicted and sentenced.  Id.  
Denial of a motion to dismiss does not constitute a final judgment because the defendant has not yet 
been tried, convicted, or sentenced.  Id.  In addition, interlocutory appeal would not be available 
under the narrow exception to the final judgment rule found in the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 
799. 
 41. Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 26, at 289 (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 305 
(1995) (holding the district court’s summary judgment order not appealable)).  See Johnson, 515 
U.S. at 313.  In Johnson, the district court’s determination that the summary judgment record raised 
a genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners’ involvement in the alleged beating of respondent was 
not a “final decision” within the meaning of the relevant statute.  Id. 
 42. Sell, 539 U.S. at 190 (noting that in the 54 years since Cohen, only three prejudgment 
orders in criminal cases have been found appealable). 
 43. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7 (1951) (holding that the defendants’ bail was not fixed by 
proper methods).  See Pamela Johns, Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Trials: Appellate Review of 
Vindictive Prosecution Claims, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 373, 374 (1982) (examining the policy issues 
involved in allowing prejudgment appeal of vindictive prosecution claims).  Johns explains that in 
Stack, the Supreme Court considered an appeal from an order denying a motion for the reduction of 
bail: 
The Court did not analyze the collateral order doctrine, but summarily stated that 
because the district court has no discretion and must reduce bail when it is excessive, the 
motion to reduce bail is appealable as a “final order.”  The concurring opinion analyzed 
an order fixing bail in light of the collateral order doctrine and determined that such an 
order is immediately reviewable because the order is collateral to the trial issues, and that 
it must be reviewed before sentence or it “never can be reviewed at all.” 
Id. at 374. 
 44. Abney, 431 U.S. at 662.  See Johns, supra note 43, at 374-75.  In Abney, the Court denied 
defendant’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.  Id. at 662.  The Court went through the 
collateral order analysis to determine if defendant’s issue was worthy of collateral appeal.  Johns, 
supra note 43, at 374-75. 
The Supreme Court found that the first prong of the collateral order doctrine was 
satisfied because the district court made a complete and final rejection of the double 
7
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Speech or Debate Clause.45 
B.  Forced Medication for Trial Competency 
1.  The History of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs46 
Issues over involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication 
are not new to the United States Supreme Court.47  Traditionally, courts 
have given institutional authorities the power to regulate supervision and 
 
jeopardy claim.  The Court found that the second prong was met, because the double 
jeopardy claim did not challenge the merits of the case and therefore the claim was 
collateral.  Instead of attacking evidence to be used at trial, defendant was challenging 
the “very authority of the Government to hale him into court.” In examining whether the 
third prong of the collateral order doctrine was satisfied, the Court stated that the policies 
underlying the double jeopardy clause would be “significantly undermined” if review of 
the claim was postponed until after conviction. 
Id. 
 45. Heltoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus 
directing the district court to dismiss an indictment).  See Johns, supra note 43, at 374-75.  In 
Helstoski v. Meanor, the Supreme Court found the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment 
based on the speech and debate clause of the Constitution immediately appealable.  Id. at 375 (citing 
Heltoski, 422 U.S. at 508).  Again, the Court applied the collateral order test to the facts of the case.  
Id. 
The Court summarily concluded that the first two prongs of the collateral order doctrine 
were satisfied, relying on Abney to support its finding that the order was a final rejection 
of the matter by the district court and collateral to the triable issues.  When considering 
whether the third prong of the collateral order doctrine was met, the Court found that the 
speech or debate clause protects congressmen from the burden of having to defend 
themselves for “any Speech or Debate in either House.” Because the Constitution 
protects congressmen from the burden of trial itself, interlocutory appeal is necessary for 
effective relief and the third prong of the collateral order doctrine was satisfied. 
Id. 
 46. SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 129 (4th ed. 1975).  Psychotropic drugs include any 
medications that affect mentation.  Id.  Antipsychotic drugs are any of the powerful tranquilizers (as 
the phenothiazines or butyrophenones) used especially to treat psychosis and believed to act by 
blocking dopamine nervous receptors—called also neuroleptic.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY (Electronic ed. 1997), at http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm.  
Psychosis is a serious mental disorder (such as schizophrenia) characterized by defective or lost 
contact with reality often with hallucinations or delusions.  Id.  Antipsychotic drugs alter the 
chemical balance in an individual’s brain, changing one’s cognitive processes.  Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (recognizing that inmates have a Fourteenth Amendment right to 
refuse treatment).  Antipsychotic medication is not a cure, but rather suppression for symptoms such 
as hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia.  Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 927 (N.D. Ohio 
1980) (finding that prevalent use of psychotropic drugs was counter-therapeutic and was justifiable 
for the convenience of the staff and for punishment).  See also Jessica Litman, Note, A Common 
Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1720, 
1725 (1982) (explaining antipsychotic medication and the effects on patients). 
 47. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177-78. 
8
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treatment of involuntarily committed mental patients.48  This trend 
changed in the middle of the twentieth century, as mental health became 
a hot topic for advocacy.49 
The initial federal litigation over forced medication occurred in the 
late 1970s.50  The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 
granted involuntarily committed mental patients a legal right to refuse 
antipsychotic drugs in Rennie v. Klein.51  One year after Rennie, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a similar holding 
in Rogers v. Okin.52  That court held that “whatever powers the 
Constitution has granted our government, involuntary mind control is 
 
 48. See generally Litman, supra note 46, at 1725 (discussing mental institutions and 
antipsychotic medication in involuntary confinement). 
 49. Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right to 
Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 286 (1992) (examining the history of one’s right 
to refuse antipsychotic drugs).  According to Cichon, “Litigated issues included the criteria for 
involuntary commitment, patient rights, institutional conditions, the interplay between the criminal 
process and the civil mental health systems, and the adequacy of treatment.”  Id. 
 50. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (denying an injunction that would 
restrain officials from medicating the plaintiff without his consent in non-emergency 
circumstances), modified by 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated by 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).  See 
Kris W. Druhm, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California Penal Law Code 645, The Castration 
of Sex Offenders and the Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 285, 310 (1997) (addressing the legal 
implications involved in castration laws).  As the court in Rennie v. Klein explained: 
[There is] a four-prong test to evaluate whether a specific drug therapy should be 
classified as treatment or punishment before applying the tests for cruel and unusual 
punishment. These prongs include: (1) does the drug possess any therapeutic value; (2) is 
the drug one that is accepted within the medical community as effective; (3) is the drug 
in question part of a continuous/ongoing therapy program; and (4) if negative long-term 
side effects result from the drug therapy, are they too harsh in light of the benefits 
received. 
Id. (citing Rennie, 462 F. Supp. 1131). 
 51. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. 1131.  In Rennie, the district court issued two different opinions.  
Cichon, supra note 49, at 426 n.12.  “The first opinion was based on a motion for a preliminary 
injunction filed on behalf of John Rennie.  The second opinion was generated by a class action filed 
on behalf of patients of five New Jersey state mental hospitals based on John Rennie’s amended 
complaint.”  Id. (citing 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), aff’d in part, modified in part, and 
remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on 
remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983)).  The federal district court held that the standard for 
determining whether forced medication was proper for mentally ill patients “turns on whether the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the 
decision on such a judgment.”  Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268 (3d Cir. 1983) (on remand 
following Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)). 
 52. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that a Massachusetts law 
created a presumption that a mental patient was competent and that the mental patients had a right to 
refuse medication in non-emergency situations), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st 
Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).  In Rogers v. Okin, a federal 
court prevented a hospital from administering psychotropic drugs through force, because such an 
action violated the inmates’ “freedom of individual thought.”  Druhm, supra note 50, at 332. 
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not one of them, absent extraordinary circumstances.”53 
2.  Prior Supreme Court Decisions on Forced Medication 
Before Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court considered two 
more recent cases involving forced medication.54  In Washington v. 
Harper55 and Riggins v. Nevada,56 the Supreme Court decided that the 
 
 53. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1367.  “The fact that mind control takes place in a mental 
institution in the form of medically sound treatment of mental disease is not, itself, an extraordinary 
circumstance warranting an unsanctioned intrusion on the integrity of a human being.”  Id.  
Professor Dennis Cichon explains: 
The court’s opinion [in Rogers] can possibly be interpreted as supporting the 
“unconditional” argument that First Amendment protections encompass the generation 
of even disordered thought.  In finding First Amendment implications, the court made 
the broad statement that “psychotropic medication has the potential to affect and change 
a patient’s mood, attitude and capacity to think.”  The court also stated that “[t]he right 
to produce a thought . . . is a fundamental element of freedom.”  These statements, 
standing alone, could imply that any thought, even if psychotic, is entitled to First 
Amendment protection. 
Cichon, supra note 49, at 426 n. 257 (emphasis in the original). 
 54. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (acknowledging that prison inmates have, 
both by operation of the state prison policy and by the Fourteenth Amendment, a liberty interest in 
avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic medications); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 
(1992) (holding that forced medication may implicate an inmate’s right to a full and fair trial, and 
therefore defendant was constitutionally entitled to have administration of anti-psychotic drugs 
cease before trial).  See Elizabeth A. Schmidtlein, Notes: Riggins v. Nevada: The Accused’s Right to 
“Just Say No” to Antipsychotic Drugs?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 541, 542 (1994) 
(analyzing Riggins) for an analysis of the Riggins decision in light of forced medication. 
 55. Harper, 494 U.S. 210.  In Harper, the Court reviewed the claim of whether a judicial 
hearing is necessary before the State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs 
against his will.  Id. at 213.  The Court was required in Harper to discuss the protections given to 
the prisoner under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  See T. Howard 
Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental Disorders: 
Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 315 (1997) (arguing that there is no 
more complicated a problem within criminal justice than that posed by the needs of persons with 
severe mental disorders). 
Under prison regulations that existed at the time, an unconsenting inmate could not be 
involuntarily medicated with antipsychotic drugs unless both (1) the inmate suffered 
from a “mental disorder” and, (2) the inmate was “gravely disabled” or posed a 
“likelihood of serious harm, to himself, others, or their property.”  Any inmate who 
refused to take the antipsychotic medication was entitled to a hearing before a committee 
that consisted of a nontreating psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Associate 
Superintendent of the treatment center for inmates with severe mental disorders. 
Id. 
 56. Riggins, 504 U.S. 127.  See Medicolegal Reference Library: Selected Recent Court 
Decisions, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 277, 295 (1992) (analyzing 1992 decisions dealing with medicine 
and the law).  In Riggins, while awaiting trial, defendant told a psychiatrist that he was having 
trouble sleeping and was hearing voices.  Id.  “Defendant was treated with sizeable doses of 
Mellaril, an antipsychotic medicine that often has outwardly discernible side effects.”  Id. The 
doctors subsequently treated Riggins with Dilantin.  Id.  The District Court denied Riggins’ motion 
10
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Constitution permits the government to involuntarily administer 
antipsychotic medication to render a mentally ill defendant competent to 
stand trial on serious criminal charges.57  The Court permitted the 
government to do so only if the treatment is medically appropriate,58 is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the 
fairness of the trial,59 and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives,60 
 
to suspend administration of Mellaril.  Id.  Riggins presented an insanity defense at trial and 
psychiatric experts subsequently testified that the side effects of the Mellaril might include 
drowsiness or confusion, severe enough to affect his thought processes.  Id.  Riggins was convicted 
of murder and sentenced to death.  Id. 
 57. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-79.  “A criminal defendant’s ability to stand trial is measured by the 
capacity to understand the proceedings, to consult meaningfully with counsel, and to assist in the 
defense.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (7th ed. 1999) (defining competency).  Both Harper and 
Riggins were accused of “serious” crimes.  Walter Harper was sentenced to prison in 1976 for 
robbery.  Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.  David Riggins was charged with murder and robbery.  Riggins, 
504 U.S. at 129. 
 58. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Tuberculosis and the Power of the State: Toward the 
Development of Rational Standards for the Review of Compulsory Public Health Powers, 2 U. CHI. 
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 219 n.289 (1995) (exploring rational standards for the exercise of 
compulsory public health powers).  In the Riggins case, the Supreme Court held that forced 
antipsychotic medication for a defendant sentenced to death could satisfy due process if the state 
demonstrated that treatment was “medically appropriate and, considering less restrictive 
alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”  Id.  A medically 
appropriate treatment has a “reasonable possibility” of effects such as “prolongation of life that is 
currently meaningful to the patient, restoration of function, relief of pain and suffering.”  Judith F. 
Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 221, 240 
n.85 (1995) (suggesting that physicians and their sponsoring hospitals clearly define the limits of 
treatment they are willing to provide in any given circumstance).  A treatment that lacks the 
“reasonable possibility” of reaching these goals is therefore considered medically inappropriate.  Id. 
 59. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137.  See Vickie L. Feeman, Reassessing Forced Medication of 
Criminal Defendants in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 35 B.C. L. REV. 681, 688 (1994) (suggesting a 
comprehensive approach for reviewing challenges to the forced medication of criminal defendants).  
The Court in Riggins reviewed expert testimony offered at the hearing on Riggins’ motion 
requesting termination of the medication.  Id.  One expert testified that the level of Riggins’ 
medication “was within the toxic range and likely to make him anxious or nervous.”  Id. 
Another psychiatrist had claimed that Riggins was likely to suffer from drowsiness or 
confusion, and a brief from the American Psychiatric Association alleged that the level 
of medication administered to Riggins could have affected his thought processes.  In 
light of this evidence, the Court concluded it was clearly possible that the drugs impacted 
not only the substance of Riggins’ testimony on direct or cross examination, but also his 
ability to communicate with counsel and to follow and participate in the proceedings. 
Id. 
 60. Feeman, supra note 59, at 688.  Less intrusive alternatives can include lowering the 
dosages of medication administered to the defendant.  See also Steven Mintz, The Nightmare of 
Forcible Medication: The New York Court of Appeals Protects the Rights of the Mentally Ill Under 
the State Constitution: Rivers v. Katz, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 885, 910 (1987).  According to Mintz, 
the theory of less intrusive alternatives provides: 
[G]overnmental action should not intrude upon constitutionally protected interests to a 
degree greater than necessary to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose.  The choice 
of proper treatment depends on medical and psychiatric opinion, and whether the 
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is necessary to further important governmental trial-related interests.61 
In Harper, the Supreme Court recognized that an individual has a 
“significant” constitutionally protected “liberty interest” in “avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.”62  The Supreme Court 
did, however, uphold the State of Washington’s right to medicate a 
defendant against his will, as long as an independent decision-maker 
provides a thorough evaluation of the defendant.63  The Court held that 
the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who 
has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, as 
long as he is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in his 
medical interest.64  Although Harper set a standard for forcibly 
 
treatment strikes a proper balance between efficacy and intrusiveness.  Under this 
balancing process, the court would require the psychiatrist to determine whether a 
different drug, a smaller dosage, or a different therapy could serve the interests of the 
patient and the state. 
Id. at 910-11. 
 61. Harper, 494 U.S. 210; Riggins, 504 U.S. 127. 
 62. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221. 
 63. Id. at 235-36.  Walter Harper was sentenced to prison for robbery in 1976.  Id. at 214.  
Until 1980, Harper was incarcerated at the Washington State Penitentiary.  Id.  During most of his 
time at the penitentiary, Harper was in the prison’s mental health unit.  Id.  While in the unit, he 
consented to the administration of antipsychotic drugs.  Id.  Harper earned parole in 1980, 
conditioned on his willingness to participate in psychiatric treatment.  Id.  While on parole, the 
Court ordered Harper to civil commitment at Western State Hospital.  Id.  In the winter of 1981, 
Harper assaulted two nurses at a hospital in Seattle, and his parole was subsequently revoked.  Id.  
Once back in the prison system, Harper was sent to a special correctional institute for diagnosis and 
treatment for “convicted felons with serious behavior or mental disorders.”  Id.  Upon arrival at the 
facility, Harper voluntarily consented to treatment, but in November 1982, he stopped taking the 
prescribed medications.  Id.  The doctor in charge tried to medicate Harper against Harper’s 
protests.  Id.  The Supreme Court upheld Washington’s right to medicate Harper against his will, as 
long as a thorough examination was performed by an independent board.  Id. at 218.  As long as the 
board determined that the individual was a danger to himself or others, and received the approval of 
the inmate’s psychiatrist, forcible medication would be allowed.  Jonathan Wilson, Competent 
Through Medication to Stand Trial, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE, March 2003, at 1.  For an in-depth 
look at the Harper case’s procedure and fact development, see Brian Shagan, Washington v. 
Harper: Forced Medication and Substantive Due Process, 25 CONN. L. REV. 265, 279-83 (1992) 
(arguing that analysis of Harper must focus on the substantive due process issues). 
 64. Harper, 494 U.S. at 210, syllabus point 2.  Although Harper has a liberty interest under 
the Due Process Clause in being free from the arbitrary administration of such medication, the Court 
held that: 
The Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious 
mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if he is dangerous to himself or 
others and the treatment is in his medical interest.  Although Harper has a liberty interest 
under the Clause in being free from the arbitrary administration of such medication, the 
Policy comports with substantive due process requirements, since it is reasonably related 
to the State’s legitimate interest in combating the danger posed by a violent, mentally ill 
inmate.  The Policy is a rational means of furthering that interest, since it applies 
exclusively to mentally ill inmates who are gravely disabled or represent a significant 
danger to themselves or others; the drugs may be administered only for treatment and 
12
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medicating a prisoner, the case was not direct precedent for the Sell 
court because Dr. Sell was deemed non-dangerous and had not yet been 
convicted of a crime.65 
In Riggins, the Supreme Court reiterated that an individual has a 
constitutionally protected liberty “interest in avoiding involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic drugs,” an interest that only an essential 
or overriding state interest might overcome.66  The Nevada Supreme 
Court held that expert testimony presented at trial was sufficient to 
inform the jury of an antipsychotic medication’s67 effect on Riggins’ 
demeanor and testimony.68  Riggins, arrested for murder and robbery, 
was subsequently placed on the prescribed antipsychotic drug.69  Riggins 
filed a motion to be taken off the drug until after trial, and the trial court 
denied the motion without explanation.70  He was convicted of murder 
 
under the direction of a licensed psychiatrist; and there is little dispute in the psychiatric 
profession that the proper use of the drugs is an effective means of treating and 
controlling a mental illness likely to cause violent behavior. 
Id.  The Court reasoned that the right to be free of medication had to be balanced against the state’s 
duty to treat mentally ill inmates and run a safe prison.  Id.  The Court concluded the state’s 
procedures did not deprive inmates of the right to refuse treatment without adequate due process.  
Id. 
 65. Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.  See also Wilson, supra note 63, at 1. 
 66. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35. 
 67. Id. at 132.  Riggins told the doctor that Mellaril had worked for him in the past.  Id. at 
129. The opinion in Riggins explained that “Mellaril is the trade name for thioridazine, an 
antipsychotic drug.”  Id.  After consultation, the doctor prescribed Mellaril at 100 milligrams per 
day.  Id.  However, the doctor increased the dosage incrementally, because Riggins complained of 
hearing voices and reoccurring sleep problems since beginning the medication.  Id. 
 68. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127.  After Riggins was found competent to stand trial, Riggins made 
a motion to suspend administration of Mellaril until after his trial, arguing that “its use infringed 
upon his freedom, that its effect on his demeanor and mental state during trial would deny him due 
process, and that he had the right to show jurors his true mental state when he offered an insanity 
defense.”  Id. at 129.  After testimony from doctors who had examined Riggins, the court denied 
Riggins’ motion, yet gave no explanation as to its rationale from deciding as such.  Id. at 131.  Once 
Riggins went to trial he claimed insanity, and his counsel unsuccessfully attempted an insanity 
defense.  Id.  Riggins was convicted and subsequently sentenced to death.  Id. 
 69. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 129.  The defendant was found competent to stand trial, although one 
psychiatrist testified that he was not competent.  Id. at 130.  The Clark County District Court 
determined that Riggins was legally sane and competent to stand trial, so preparations for trial went 
forward.  Id. 
 70. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 131.  The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Riggins’ 
motion, at which one doctor “guessed” as to whether taking the defendant off the forced medication 
would alter his behavior or render him incompetent to stand trial.  Id.  Another doctor testified that, 
in his opinion, Riggins “would be competent to stand trial even without the administration of the 
drug, but that the effects of drug would not be noticeable to jurors if medication continued.”  Id. at 
130-31. A third doctor told the court that the drug made the defendant “calmer and more relaxed,” 
but that too much mediation could make the defendant appear tired and listless.  Id.  To the 
frustration of the defendant, the district court denied Riggins’ motion to terminate his forced 
medication.  Id. at 131. 
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and robbery, and the State Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.71  
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that once Riggins filed a 
motion to terminate administration of antipsychotic medication, the State 
became obligated to establish the need for the drug and its medical 
appropriateness.72  In light of the Court’s opinion, the Nevada Supreme 
Court vacated Riggins’ conviction and death sentence and remanded the 
case to the district court for a new trial.73 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of the Facts and Procedural History 
The Petitioner Charles Sell, a former dentist, suffered from mental 
illness for many years.74  In May 1997, the United States charged Dr. 
 
 71. Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 539 (Nev. 1991) (finding that the expert testimony 
regarding the effect of the medication upon defendant was sufficient to protect defendant’s right to a 
full and fair trial).  Once Riggins moved to terminate his treatment, the state became obligated to 
establish both the need for Mellaril and its medical appropriateness.  See Harper 494 U.S. at 227; 
infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.  The state could have easily satisfied due process 
concerns if it had demonstrated that the treatment was “medically appropriate” and considered less 
intrusive alternatives “essential for Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”  Riggins, 504 U.S. 
at 135.  If found medically appropriate, the state might also have justified the treatment by 
demonstrating that an adjudication of guilt or innocence was not possible by using less intrusive 
means.  Id.  However, the trial court allowed the drug’s administration to continue without 
providing “any determination of the need for this course or any findings about reasonable 
alternatives,” and it failed to acknowledge Riggins’ liberty interest in freedom from antipsychotic 
drugs.  Id. at 136. 
 72. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.  The Court found that it was possible that the side effects had an 
impact upon Riggins’ outward appearance, “the content of his testimony on direct or cross-
examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communication with 
counsel.”  Id. at 137.  Thus, Riggins’ Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.  Id. 
 73. Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 705 (Nev. 1993) (vacating the judgment of conviction and 
sentence of death and remanding the case for a new trial).  The court held that Riggins’ retrial would 
be conducted: 
[W]ithout the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications of any type, 
unless the district court shall find, following the cessation of all such medications, that 
the administration of antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate and essential, 
considering less intrusive alternatives, to ensure the safety of appellant or the safety of 
others, or that the administration of antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate 
and necessary in order to maintain Riggins’ competence to stand trial, and that Riggins’ 
competence cannot be maintained through the use of less intrusive means. 
Id. at 705-706. 
 74. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169.  In September 1982, Sell told doctors that “communists had 
contaminated the gold he used for fillings.”  Id.  Dr. Sell was subsequently hospitalized, treated with 
antipsychotic medication, and thereafter discharged.  Id.  In June 1984, Dr. Sell called the police and 
told them that a leopard was outside his office boarding a bus, and then Sell asked the police to 
shoot him.  Id.  At this point, Dr. Sell was re-hospitalized and released shortly after.  Id. at 169-70.  
Often, Dr. Sell complained that public officials, such as a state governor and a police chief, were 
14
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Sell with insurance fraud.75  Also that month, the Government filed a 
motion requesting a psychological examination to determine Dr. Sell’s 
competency to stand trial.76  After ordering the examination, a federal 
Magistrate initially found Dr. Sell currently competent to stand trial for 
fraud.77  Although the judge noted that Dr. Sell might experience “a 
psychotic episode” in the future, he released him on bail.78  A grand jury 
later indicted Dr. Sell and his wife on fifty-six counts of mail fraud,79 six 
 
trying to kill him.  Id. at 170.  In April 1997, he told law enforcement personnel that he “spoke to 
God last night,” and that “God told me every [Federal Bureau of Investigation] person I kill, a soul 
will be saved.”  Id. 
 75. Id.  Dr. Sell was charged with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 1035(a)(2) (2000) which reads: 
Whoever, in any matter involving a health care benefit program, knowingly and willfully 
makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or 
makes or uses any materially false writing or document knowing the same to contain any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, in connection with the 
delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
Id. 
 76. Brief for the United States at 2, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) 
[hereinafter United States Brief].  See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000) which reads: 
At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the 
sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a 
motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court 
shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental 
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist 
properly in his defense. 
Id. 
 77. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.  The Magistrate ordered Dr. Sell to the U.S. Medical Center for 
Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, for an evaluation under 18 U.S.C. 4241(b) (2000).  
United States Brief at 2.  See 18 U.S.C § 4241(b).  Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may 
order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, and that a 
psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of section 
4247(b) and (c).  Id. 
 78. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170. 
 79. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000): 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or 
furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, 
or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such 
counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or 
attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, 
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or 
causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any 
private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives there from, any such matter 
or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the 
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to 
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counts of Medicaid fraud,80 and one count of money laundering.81 
The Magistrate in the case held a bail revocation hearing.82  The 
judge described Dr. Sell’s behavior at his initial appearance as “totally 
out of control.”83  A psychiatrist reported that Sell could not sleep 
because he expected the FBI to “come busting through the door,” and 
concluded that Dr. Sell’s condition had worsened.84  After considering 
that report and other testimony, the Magistrate revoked Dr. Sell’s bail.85 
On April 23, 1998, the grand jury returned a new indictment 
charging Dr. Sell with conspiring to commit murder.86  The court 
subsequently joined the attempted murder and fraud cases for trial.87 
In February 1999, Dr. Sell asked the Magistrate for reconsideration 
regarding his competence to stand trial.88  Both Dr. Sell’s psychiatrist 
 
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, 
such person shall be fined not more than $ 1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 
years, or both. 
Id. 
 80. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1)(i) (2000): 
Whoever knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or 
representation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment under a 
Federal health care program, shall in the case of such a statement, representation, 
concealment, failure, or conversion by any other person in connection with the 
furnishing (by that person) of items or services for which payment is or may be made 
under the program, be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof fined not more than 
$ 25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or both. 
Id. 
 81. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2000): 
Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), knowingly engages or 
attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a 
value greater than $ 10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be 
punished as provided in subsection (b). 
Id. 
 82. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.  After another charge that Dr. Sell had attempted to intimidate a 
witness, the court held a bail hearing in which Dr. Sell’s bond was revoked.  United States Brief at 
2. 
 83. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.  In 1998, Dr. Sell’s behavior at his trial for attempting to intimidate 
a witness was “totally out of control,” according to the judge.  Id.  Sell screamed and shouted, used 
personal and racial insults, and even spit in the judge’s face.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  Dr. Sell was arrested for the attempted murder of the FBI agent who had arrested him, 
and a former employee at his dental office who planned to testify against him in the fraud case.  Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.  The Magistrate sent Dr. Sell to the United States Medical Center 
for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, for examination.  Id. at 170-71.  Subsequently the 
Magistrate found by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Sell was “mentally incompetent to 
stand trial.”  United States Brief at 3.  He ordered Dr. Sell to undergo treatment at the Medical 
Center for up to four months, “to determine whether there was a substantial probability that [Dr. 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/7
SCHULTZ1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:11 AM 
2005] SELL V. UNITED STATES 519 
and the government’s psychiatrist determined that Dr. Sell suffered from 
a delusional disorder of the persecutory type.89  The Magistrate ordered 
Dr. Sell hospitalized for a period of up to four months to determine if Dr. 
Sell would regain his competency.90  Two months later, while at the U.S. 
Medical Center, staff members instructed Dr. Sell to take antipsychotic 
medication, which he consequently refused.91  The reviewing 
psychiatrist then authorized the administration of the drugs.92 
The Medical Center took up the decision on an administrative 
review.93  The doctors requested an administrative hearing to authorize 
the administration of the medication against Dr. Sell’s will.94  At the 
June 1999 hearing, a Bureau of Prisons official upheld the officer’s 
decision that Dr. Sell would benefit from the utilization of antipsychotic 
medication.95 
In front of the Magistrate in July 1999, Dr. Sell disputed the order 
in a motion contesting the Medical Center’s right to forcibly administer 
his medication.96  The Magistrate permitted the administration of the 
forced medication for several reasons.97  The government, however, did 
 
Sell] would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 171. 
 89. Id.  Delusional disorder, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association, refers to a 
group of conditions in which the central feature is the presence of delusions in the absence of other 
symptomatology.  DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 297.1 at 323 
(4th ed. 2000).  The most essential feature of Delusional Disorder is one or more nonbizarre (i.e., 
involving situations that could occur in real life) delusions, present for at least one month.  Id. at 
323.  According to the American Psychiatric Association, the persecutory type of delusional 
disorder is the most common presentation of delusional disorder.  Id.  Patients are convinced that 
others are attempting to do them harm.  Id. at 325. They often attempt to obtain legal recourse, and 
sometimes may resort to violence.  Id. 
 90. Sell, 539 U.S. at 171. 
 91. Id.  Sell had an administrative hearing to determine if antipsychotic drugs would be used 
in his treatment.  Id.  The doctors involved in the decision considered several past episodes, and the 
possibility of Dr. Sell’s schizophrenia.  United States Brief at 3.  See also Petitioner’s Brief at 15.  
In the Involuntary Medication Report prepared by the doctors, Sell indicated, “I do not want to take 
medicine.  I do not want my chemistry altered.  My brain is working well.”  Id. 
 92. Sell, 539 U.S. at 171.  The psychiatrist made his decision based on several factors: the 
determination that Dr. Sell was mentally ill and dangerous, the decision that medication was 
necessary to treat the mental illness, and the hope that Dr. Sell would become competent to stand 
trial.  Id. at 171-72. 
 93. Id. at 172. 
 94. Id. at 171.  At the hearing, the government did not claim that Dr. Sell was dangerous.  
Petitioner’s Brief at 15. 
 95. Sell, 539 U.S. at 172.  The prison’s official concluded that antipsychotic medication was 
the intervention most likely to lessen Dr. Sell’s symptoms, as other methods would be unlikely to 
work.  Id.  The official also determined Dr. Sell was a potential safety issue to the prison 
community.  Id. 
 96. Id.  In September 1999, the magistrate who had committed Dr. Sell ordered a hearing 
regarding Sell’s claim.  Id. 
 97. Sell, 539 U.S. at 173.  The court determined Dr. Sell was a danger to himself and others.  
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not specify the type or quantity of antipsychotic drugs it planned to use 
in medicating Dr. Sell.98 
In April of 2001, the District Court affirmed the Magistrate’s 
decision to medicate, but found the court’s finding on dangerousness 
clearly erroneous.99  Despite this disagreement, the District Court 
determined that involuntary medication was the best hope of rendering 
Dr. Sell competent to stand trial.100 
In March 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit granted certiorari to review the lower court judgment permitting 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to Dr. Sell in order to 
render him competent to stand trial for a serious, but nonviolent crime.101  
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court, 
determining that the Government had a serious interest in the fraud 
charges looming over Sell, thus justifying the need for forced 
antipsychotic medication.102 
 
Id.  The government based its decision on Sell’s attempt to become familiar with a nurse at the 
Medical Center.  Id. at 172-73.  Dr. Sell told one of the nurses at the center that he was in love with 
her and that he “can’t help it.”  Id.  In light of this, the magistrate decided that the drugs make Dr. 
Sell less dangerous to himself and others, alleviate any serious side effects, benefit him more than 
put him at risk, and have the greatest chance at returning Dr. Sell to competency.  Id. at 173. 
 98. Petitioner’s Brief at 16 (explaining the abstract nature of the government’s proposal to 
medicate Dr. Sell). 
 99. Sell, 539 U.S. at 173-74.  See Petitioner’s Brief at 17.  “The record does not indicate that 
defendant has posed a danger to himself or others during the period of his institutionalization at the 
[Center], and the statements and conduct relied upon for a finding of dangerousness do not suggest, 
a threat of violence to the staff.”  Id. 
 100. United States v. Sell, No. 4:97CR290-DJS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22425, at *1-2 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 23, 2000).  The court held that the nature of the relief sought by the government 
counseled that the involuntary administration of drugs should be stayed pending the court’s 
reconsideration proceedings.  Id.  The opinion left the question whether and on what terms the stay 
should be extended during any proceedings before it to the court of appeals.  Id.  See also 
Petitioner’s Brief at 17.  The district court held that competency restoration on its own is enough to 
forcibly medicate a defendant.  Id.  “The seriousness of the charges against Dr. Sell contributes 
greatly to the compelling strength of the government’s interest in adjudicating defendant’s guilt.”  
Id. 
 101. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 102. Id. at 572.  The Eighth Circuit relied on medical evidence that indicated a reasonable 
likelihood that medication would allowed Dr. Sell to be an active participant in his pending trial.  Id.  
The court also noted the government’s essential interest in bringing Dr. Sell to trial, in light of the 
lack of less intrusive means to accomplish this.  Id. 
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B.  Supreme Court Decision 
1.  Majority Opinion 
The United States Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of 
jurisdiction in the Sell case.103  The Court questioned whether Dr. Sell 
could legally appeal the District Court’s pretrial order.104  If the order 
was considered a collateral order, the Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal, and therefore the United States Supreme Court would 
have jurisdiction to hear the case.105  The Court asked both Dr. Sell and 
the United States to provide briefs on the issue of jurisdiction.106  Both 
parties agreed that the Court had proper jurisdiction to review the 
case.107  The Court also agreed, determining that Sell’s appeal was a 
collateral order, and therefore the Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal.108 
The United States Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision on the 
issue of forced medication, vacated and remanded the decision of the 
Eighth Circuit.109  In its decision, the Court assumed that Dr. Sell was 
not dangerous.110  The majority opinion111 held that, based on that 
 
 103. Sell, 539 U.S. at 175-77.  The court had to determine if the Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction 
to reach the substantive merits of Sell’s case.  Id. at 175. 
 104. Id. at 177.  A defendant is normally required to wait until the end of the trial to obtain 
appellate review of a partial order.  Id.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 105. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177.  The collateral order doctrine is an exception to the final appealable 
order rule.  See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 541; 
supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 106. Charles Lane, Justices Debate Medicating Mentally Ill Man for Trial, WASHINGTON 
POST, March 4, 2003, at A04.  The justices asked both Dr. Sell and the government whether the 
original federal district court order authorizing forcible medication should have been appealable at 
all.  Id. 
 107. In its Supplemental Brief, the Government submitted that the court of appeals had 
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and the collateral order doctrine.  
Supplemental Brief for the United States at 1, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-
5664).  In its Supplemental Brief, Petitioner also submitted that the Court of Appeals had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291 pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and that the Supreme 
Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) (2000).  Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 1, Sell 
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664). 
 108. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177.  The Supreme Court held that the order conclusively determined the 
disputed question of whether Dr. Sell has a legal right to reject forced medication.  Id. at 176.  The 
Court also held that the lower order fulfilled the second requirement of resolving an important issue, 
because involuntary medication “raises questions of clear constitutional importance.”  Id.  Finally, 
the Court concluded that the issue of forced medication could not be effectively reviewed on appeal 
of final judgment, at that time, Dr. Sell would have already been subjected to the forced medication 
to which he strongly opposes.  Id. at 176-77. 
 109. Id. at 186. 
 110. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185.  The Court was required to assume that Dr. Sell is not dangerous, 
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assumption, the appellate court was wrong to approve forced medication 
solely to render a defendant competent to stand trial.112  The Court 
deemed forced medication permissible if the treatment was medically 
appropriate, substantially unlikely to have side effects that may 
undermine the trial’s fairness, necessary to further important government 
trial-related interests, and the least intrusive alternative.113  The Court 
made note that the experts involved in the Magistrate’s hearing focused 
mainly on the idea of dangerousness, while excluding other important 
issues.114  As a result, there was not enough information to know 
whether the side effects of the antipsychotic medication were likely to 
undermine the fairness of the trial in Dr. Sell’s case.115 
In dicta, the majority noted that the standards laid out by the Court 
in the Sell decision are only to be used in determining whether 
involuntary administration of drugs is significantly necessary to render 
the defendant competent to stand trial.116  If other grounds exist for 
 
merely because the Court of Appeals and District Courts found the magistrate’s holding of 
dangerousness clearly erroneous.  Id. at 184.  The Supreme Court did add, however, “if anything, 
the record before us . . . suggests the contrary.”  Id.  If the appellate court had found Sell dangerous, 
the standards set forth in Harper and Riggins could have been applied to Dr. Sell’s forced 
medication.  Id. at 185. 
 111. Sell, 539 U.S. at 166.  The majority opinion was written by Justice Breyer, joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsberg.  Id. 
 112. Id. at 185. 
 113. Id. at 179.  See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text for analysis.  The Court 
recognized that the public’s interest in prosecuting a crime must be weighed against an individual’s 
autonomy and, therefore, required the courts to go through a list of conditions that the government 
must satisfy in cases with nonviolent defendants.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.  According to Sell’s 
attorney, Barry Short, “They have set a rather high bar for the government when it’s seeking to 
medicate persons who are accused of serious nonviolent crimes.” Charles Lane, Court Sets 
Guidelines for Forced Medication, WASHINGTON POST, June 17, 2003, at A01. 
 114. Sell, 539 U.S. at 171-73.  The reviewing psychiatrist of the initial Medical Center decision 
authorized involuntary administration of drugs and added that he considered Dr. Sell dangerous 
based on threats and delusions.  Id. at 172.  The magistrate, in an August 2000 decision found that 
the government made a “substantial and very strong showing that Dr. Sell is dangerous to himself 
and others . . . .”  Id. at 173.  Issues such as trial-related side effects and risks that could have helped 
determine whether trial competence grounds alone warranted forced medication were ignored in 
light of dangerousness considerations.  Id. at 185. 
 115. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185-86.  The District Court and the Eighth Circuit found the Magistrate’s 
ruling on Dr. Sell’s dangerousness clearly erroneous, and found based on trial competency alone.  
Id. at 184.  However, the court did not take into account the correct factors such as trial-related side 
effects and risks.  Id. at 184-85.  The court looked to the holdings in Harper and Riggins, supra, to 
point out that courts have been historically permitted to administer these drugs only if the test for 
trial competency is satisfied.  Id. at 179. 
 116. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  The Sell majority noted that a court need not consider whether to 
allow forced medication for that kind of purpose, if forced medication is warranted for “a different 
purpose, such as the purposes set out in Harper related to the individual’s dangerousness, or 
purposes related to the individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely 
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forced medication, the court should seek those first.117  Therefore, the 
Court instructed the Eighth Circuit on remand to allow the government 
to pursue its request for forced medication on grounds related to those 
discussed in the Court’s opinion.118 
2.  Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by 
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, focused its discussion on the issue of 
the collateral order.119  The dissenters disagreed with the majority in its 
determination that all three prongs of the collateral order test were 
satisfied.120  Justice Scalia reasoned that a decision to medicate failed the 
third requirement of the collateral order doctrine.121  Justice Scalia 
emphasized that, until this case, the Court had interpreted the collateral 
order exception with the “utmost strictness” in criminal cases.122  The 
dissent felt that the majority’s narrow holding would allow criminal 
 
at risk.”  Id. at 182 (emphasis added).  Strong reasons exist for a court’s holding on whether forced 
administration can be justified “on these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence 
question.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In addition, the Court held: 
We consequently believe that a court, asked to approve forced administration of drugs 
for purposes of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily 
determine whether the Government seeks, or has first sought, permission for forced 
administration of drugs on these other Harper-type grounds; and, if not, why not. 
Id. at 183. 
 117. Sell, 539 U.S. at 183. 
 118. Id. at 186.  The Court noted that the government may investigate dangerousness at that 
time, but in evaluating Dr. Sell’s medical condition, the Government should do so under current 
circumstances.  Id. 
 119. Id. at 186-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 120. Sell, 539 U.S. at 189.  Scalia held that the District Court never entered a final judgment in 
the Sell case.  Id. at 186.  The District Court’s April 4, 2001, order failed to satisfy the third 
requirement of this test, ‘ineffective on review of final order.’  Id. at 189. 
 121. Id.  The Court decided in the earlier case, Riggins v. Nevada, that when forced medication 
is imposed incorrectly, the defendant is entitled to automatic vacatur of his conviction.  Riggins, 504 
U.S. at 138.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  The dissenters in Sell reasoned that because 
a defendant has right to vacate his conviction, his order is effectively reviewable on appeal from the 
final judgment.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 189-90.  Just because the defendant does not get the kind of relief 
he prefers, does not mean he cannot appeal the issue after final judgment.  Id. at 190.  Regardless of 
whether the defendant gets his “predeprivation injunction” or a “postdeprivation vacatur,” it does 
not eliminate the possibility of effective final appeal.  Id. 
 122. Id.  See also Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989); Flanagan 
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984); supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.  See 
generally United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978) (holding that defendants have no 
immediate right to appeal from civil contempt citations imposed to gain compliance with a 
discovery order).  These decisions, along with the numerous other decisions in which the court has 
declined interlocutory appeals, indicate a general proposition that the third prong of the Coopers & 
Lybrand test is satisfied only where the order at issue involves “an asserted right the legal and 
practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.”  Id. 
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defendants in a position like Dr. Sell to engage in unwanted, 
opportunistic behavior.123  The dissenters asserted that if the majority’s 
holding was applied in a faithful manner, any criminal defendant who 
asserts that a trial order will cause an immediate violation of his 
constitutional rights may immediately appeal.124  The dissenting judges 
also pointed out that Dr. Sell did not exhaust his administrative remedies 
before filing this suit in the District Court.125  Finally, the dissent 
believed that the Court should have vacated the judgment and remanded 
the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss.126 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Sell, the Supreme Court created another opportunity for a 
defendant to immediately appeal a decision, well before final 
adjudication.127  In addition, the Court set down a heightened scrutiny 
standard for forcible medication to defendants who are found 
incompetent, but pose no danger.128  This Section considers the impact 
of both the extension of the collateral order doctrine and the Court’s test 
for forcible medication of a mentally incompetent defendant for trial 
competency purposes.129 
 
 
 123. Sell, 539 U.S. at 191.  Scalia described a situation in which a defendant can voluntarily 
take his medication until halfway through trial and then quit taking it in order to collaterally appeal 
the medication order.  Id. 
 124. Id.  Scalia points out that this defendant would be able to postpone a trial for months just 
by claiming that a post-judgment appeal regarding one violation or another would come too late to 
prevent injustice.  Id.  Scalia emphasized his point with an exaggerated example in which an order 
refusing to allow a defendant to wear a “Black Power” T-shirt could be attacked as a violation of the 
defendant’s First Amendment Rights.  Id. at 192. 
 125. Id. at 193.  Dr. Sell could have filed for a pre-trial review of his medication order, by 
filing a suit under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et. seq., or a Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 338 (1971), action.  Id. 
 126. Sell, 539 U.S. at 193. 
 127. Id. at 177.  “We conclude that the District Court order from which Sell appealed was an 
appealable ‘collateral order.’  The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  And we 
consequently have jurisdiction to decide the question presented, whether involuntary medication 
violates Sell’s constitutional rights.”  Id. 
 128. Id. at 179-81.  See Lane, supra note 113, at A01; supra note 113 and accompanying text 
(laying out the majority’s test for forcible medication to render a defendant competent to stand 
trial).  See also Robert B. Bluey, The Supreme Court Makes It Tougher to Forcibly Drug Inmates, 
CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE (June 17, 2003), at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation. 
asp?Page=\Nation\archive\200306\NAT20030617b.html (quoting Dr. Sell’s attorney, Barry Short, 
who said “[I]t’s clear that the Supreme Court thinks it’s highly unlikely that the government will 
ever be able to meet the burden.”) 
 129. See infra notes 130-241 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Determining the Correct Application of the Collateral Order 
Doctrine 
Justice Breyer was correct in extending the Cohen test for collateral 
order to the issue of forcible medication.130  The majority applied the 
Court’s three-part test for appealable collateral orders,131 holding that the 
district court’s order “conclusively determined” Dr. Sell’s legal right to 
avoid forced medication,132 “resolved … questions of clear constitutional 
importance” distinct from Dr. Sell’s culpability,133 and was “effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment” on the charges.134 
 
 130. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177. 
 131. See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989); supra notes 33-37 
and accompanying text (setting out the three prongs of the Cohen collateral order test).  See also 
Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 (also cited for its construction of the collateral order test). 
 132. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176.  See also Supplemental Brief of the Petitioner at 4.  Petitioner 
explains that the Supreme Court, in another case that determined that a claim regarding double 
jeopardy satisfied the ‘conclusively determined’ standard, held: 
There can be no doubt that such orders constitute a complete, formal, and, in the trial 
court, final rejection of a criminal defendant’s double jeopardy claim.  There are simply 
no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant 
maintains is barred by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee. 
Id.  See also Abney, 431 U.S. at 659-60 (finding a right to appeal a denial of a motion to dismiss on 
double jeopardy grounds); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 321-322 (1984) (finding a 
right to avoid forced medication).  Sell is the same as Abney, in that once the Court determined that 
forcible medication was permissible, Dr. Sell had no other options to avoid the administration of the 
drugs.  Supplemental Brief of the Petitioner at 4.  Dr. Sell asserted a substantive due process right to 
resist medication.  Supplemental Brief for the United States at 6.  The Supreme Court recognized 
that an inmate housed in a prison mental health unit “possesses a significant liberty interest in 
avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Johnson v. Coto, No. 88-7618, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1485, at *2, (4th 
Cir. Feb. 4, 1991) (citing Harper, 494 U.S. 210).  The order by the district court allowing the forced 
medication “conclusively resolved” that the government’s ability to override Dr. Sell’s substantive 
due process rights and his First and Fifth Amendment rights to refuse medication.  See 
Supplemental Brief for the United States at 6; Supplemental Brief of the Petitioner at 5 (both briefs 
arguing in favor of allowing the issue of forced medication on appeal without a final order in the 
case). 
 133. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176.  The second requirement under the collateral order doctrine is that 
the order must “resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action.”  See 
Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 (finding the certification of a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 
“enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action” and, therefore 
not sufficiently collateral to justify immediate appeal).  In Sell, the merits of the indictments involve 
the guilt or innocence of the accused regarding mail fraud, healthcare fraud, and money-laundering.  
Supplemental Brief of the Petitioner at 6.  The decision on forcible medication has “nothing 
whatsoever to do with the Dr. Sell’s guilt or innocence.”  Id. at 6.  Petitioner’s claim that he may not 
be medicated does not dispute the government’s charges such as fraud, and it in no way refutes the 
government’s evidence against him.  Supplemental Brief of the United States at 9.  Dr. Sell’s claim 
is instead a First Amendment claim refuting the government’s right to force medication.  Id. 
 134. Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989) (citing Midland Asphalt Corp., 
489 U.S. at 798) (stating the general rule for effective unreviewability is that “where the order at 
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1.  Forced Medication Orders Are Not Effectively Reviewable 
Upon Appeal 
The most disputed aspect of the Court’s three-prong analysis is the 
determination that the area of forced medication cannot be effectively 
reviewed on appeal.135  The Sell Court correctly concluded that the 
approval of forced medication is effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment.136  Accordingly, “by the time of the actual trial, 
Dr. Sell would have undergone forced medication—the very harm that 
he sought to avoid.”137 
 
issue involves ‘an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were 
not vindicated before trial’”).  See also The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: I. 
Constitutional Law: 3. Involuntary Medication of  Criminal Defendants, 117 HARV. L. REV. 307, 
310 (2003) (reviewing the Sell decision) [hereinafter 2002 Term: Leading Cases].  Specifically, 
Justice Breyer distinguished Dr. Sell’s appeal from examples that Justice Scalia raised in his dissent.  
See Sell, 539 U.S. at 191-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  “This analysis effects a breathtaking expansion 
of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders.”  Id. at 191.  Justice Scalia felt that if lower court 
applied the majority’s holding faithfully, any criminal defendant who claimed that a lower court 
order was a violation of his constitutional rights could seemingly appeal immediately.  Id.   
 135. Sell, 59 U.S. at 189.  “[T]he District Court’s April 4, 2001, order fails to satisfy the third 
requirement of this test.  The Court has held that an order is ‘effectively unreviewable’ only where 
the order at issue involves ‘an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be 
destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.’”  MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 860. 
 136. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-77.  See generally Anderson, supra note 25 (explaining the policies 
behind the final judgment rule).  Anderson explains that Congress recognized the Court must 
perform a balance between the policies for the final judgment rule and the potential harm to a party 
from an erroneous decision.  Id. at 543 (citing Doe v. Vill. of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476, 1477 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that the granting of a temporary injunction was appeallable pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1))).  Jurisdiction was especially appropriate given the “severity of the intrusion 
and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue.”  See 2002 Term: Leading Cases, supra 
note 134, at 310. 
 137. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-77.  “[Dr. Sell] cannot undo that harm even if he is acquitted.”  Id. at 
177.  Other Courts have also found forced medication unreviewable on appeal.  See Kristin B. 
Gerdy, Article: “Important” and “Irreversible” but Maybe Not “Unreviewable”: The Dilemma of 
Protecting Defendants’ Rights Through the Collateral Order Doctrine, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 213, 245 
(2004) (proposing a way that the collateral order doctrine could be applied in the involuntary 
medication setting while upholding the doctrine’s narrow application) (citing United States v. 
Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that “if the defendant should prevail after he has 
been forcibly medicated, his right to refuse to be medicated would have been lost and his victory 
would be a hollow one”) vacated by 539 U.S. 939 (2003)); United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 
259 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court’s order would be effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment of conviction, because once the defendant had been forcibly medicated 
pursuant to the order, “a determination of the procedural safeguards to which he was entitled prior 
thereto would amount to a purely academic exercise”)).  In developing the collateral order doctrine, 
the Court recognized that some interests are too fundamental to a person’s rights and liberties to 
justify waiting until the end of the trial for appeal.  Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 499 (citing Midland 
Asphalt Corp., 489 U.S. at 798).  In Lauro Lines, the Court reiterated that in the past they held the 
deprivation of the right not to be tried as effectively unreviewable after a final judgment is rendered 
in criminal prosecutions.  S. Christian Mullgarat, Settlement Agreements and the Collateral Order 
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The dissent, however, disapproved of the majority’s decision that 
forced medication is unreviewable.138  The dissent incorrectly states that 
vacatur139 is an appropriate remedy for forced medication on appeal, and 
therefore reviewable on appeal.140  In making this determination, the 
dissent fails to distinguish between Dr. Sell’s substantive due process 
and First Amendment claim, and his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to 
 
Doctrine: A Step in the Wrong Direction?, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 156 (1995) (analyzing Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994)) (citing Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 599).  
See 2002 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 134, at 316.  “Sell actually asserted a right not to be 
medicated for trial, a right that if upheld would prevent trial for the foreseeable future.”  Id.  The 
government would never be able to prosecute Dr. Sell if he was deemed incompetent to stand trial.  
Id.  Any determination of Dr. Sell’s appeal would be indicative of whether any trial would occur at 
all.  Id.  Dr. Sell’s attorney, Barry Short, explained in oral arguments, that forced medication cannot 
be effectively reviewed. Transcript of Oral Argument, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) 
(No. 02-5664), available in 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 21, at 6 (Mar. 3, 2003): 
Once [Dr. Sell is] medicated with these drugs, whatever changes take place, these drugs 
are meant to cause changes to take place.  That’s the purpose of giving him these drugs.  
In effect, the decision will have been made, his mind will have been altered, in whatever 
segment that is altered, and that cannot be undone. 
Id. at 7. 
 138. Sell, 539 U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
It is true that, if petitioner must wait until final judgment to appeal, he will not receive 
the type of remedy he would prefer—a predeprivation injunction rather than the 
postdeprivation vacatur of conviction provided by Riggins. But that ground for 
interlocutory appeal is emphatically rejected  by our cases. 
Id. at 190.  See, e.g., Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (disallowing interlocutory 
appeal of an order disqualifying defense counsel).  See also United States v. Hollywood Motor Car 
Co., 458 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1982) (per curiam) (disallowing an interlocutory appeal of an order 
denying motion to dismiss indictment on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness); Carroll v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957) (disallowing an interlocutory appeal of an order denying motion to 
suppress evidence).  But see Sell, 539 U.S. at 177, for Justice Breyer’s reply that several factors 
serve to limit the scope of the interlocutory appeal dimension of the decision, perhaps extending it 
no further than to appeals of this issue.  Id.  These factors include the “severity of the intrusion and 
corresponding importance of the constitutional issue,” the fact that the involuntary administration 
issue is completely distinct from any questions of trial procedure, and the fact that a constitutional 
deprivation (administering the drug without sufficient justification) is impossible to undo once the 
drug has been administered.  Id. at 176-77. 
 139. Vacatur is defined as either “the act of annulling or setting aside,” or a “rule or order by 
which a proceeding is vacated.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (7th ed. 1999). 
 140. Sell, 539 U.S. at 189-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The dissenters in Sell explained the 
Court’s holding in Riggins in which the Riggins Court determined that forced medication of a 
criminal defendant that fails to comply with the Harper restrictions creates an unacceptable risk of 
trial error and entitles the defendant to automatic vacatur of his conviction.  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 
135-138.  Justice Scalia reasoned that “The Court is therefore wrong to say that ‘an ordinary appeal 
comes too late for a defendant to enforce’ this right . . . and appellate review of any substantive-due-
process challenge to the District Court’s  April 4, 2001, order must wait until after conviction and 
sentence have been imposed.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 189-90.  This opinion is contrary to other cases the 
Court has seen regarding the doctrine.  See Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 499 (discussing the criminal 
defendant’s right to appeal regarding avoiding trial altogether). 
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a fair trial.141  Although vacation of the court’s decision on subsequent 
review would vindicate Dr. Sell’s trial right, his due process and First 
Amendment claims would be forever lost.142  If Dr. Sell is acquitted, he 
has no chance to appeal the forced medication directive, thus having 
suffered the harm with no recourse.143 
2.  Maintaining Narrow Access to Appeal Without Final Judgment 
Contrary to the dissent’s concern,144 the decision in Sell will have a 
small effect on the area of appeals because, although it may expand the 
current exceptions to the final decision rule, forcible medication is one 
of those situations for which the doctrine was created to protect the 
defendant.145  The dissent incorrectly feels this will make it easy for a 
 
 141. Supplemental Brief for the United States at 13. 
 142. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-77.  The Sell Court explained, “He cannot undo that harm even if he 
is acquitted.  Indeed, if he is acquitted, there will be no appeal through which he might obtain 
review.”  Id. at 177.  See also Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524 (1988) (holding that a 
denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of immunity from civil process was not immediately 
appealable).  The Court in Van Cauwenberghe held that the final judgment rule allows a litigant to 
appeal pre-final judgment in certain narrow circumstances in which the right would be “irretrievably 
lost” absent an immediate appeal.  Id. (citing Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 
(1985)).  For more detail on the concept of “irretrievably lost,” see Anderson, supra note 25, at 576. 
 143. Supplemental Brief for the United States at 14.  “[T]he liberty interest in avoiding 
unwanted antipsychotic medication must be vindicated before the medication is administered, or not 
at all.”  Id. at 14-15.  Cf. Abney, 431 U.S. at 662.  In Abney, a double jeopardy case on collateral 
review, the Court held, “[E]ven if the accused is acquitted, or, if convicted, had his conviction 
ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has still been forced to endure a trial that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit.”  Id.  But see Sell, 539 U.S. at 192-93 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Sell could have obtained pretrial review of the forced medication order in other ways, 
such as a challenge to the Administrative Procedures Act or by filing a Bivens suit.  Id. at 193.  In 
these types of suits, “[Dr. Sell] could have obtained immediate appellate review of denial of relief.”  
Id. 
 144. Id. at 191.  The dissent expressed a concern that the majority created a new rule with 
respect to the collateral order doctrine, with strongly adverse effects.  Id.  Justice Scalia gives 
examples of extreme cases in which the majority’s decision would create unnecessary expansion of 
the collateral order doctrine, such as “requiring the defendant to wear an electronic bracelet” or “an 
order refusing to allow the defendant to wear a T-shirt that says ‘Black Power’ in front of the jury” 
as violations of the defendant’s First Amendment rights.  Id. at 191-92.  According to a Harvard 
Law Review article, jurisdiction in Sell was especially appropriate given the “severity of the 
intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue.”  2002 Term: Leading Cases, 
supra note 134, at 310.  But see Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984); Carroll v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957) (holding that appellate review of orders that might infringe on a 
defendant’s constitutionally protected rights still had to wait until final judgment). 
 145. As previously explained, the collateral order doctrine has been interpreted “with the 
utmost strictness” in criminal cases in order to to maintain the finality of judgment rule.  Sell, 539 
U.S. at 190 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  See also John Paul Sellers, III, Between a Writ 
and a Hard Place: Does Ohio Revised Code Section 2505.02 Adequately Safeguard a Person’s 
Right Not to Be Tried?, 28 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 285, 289 (2002) (exploring whether a defendant who 
asserts a right not to be tried can pursue the issue in an immediate appeal under § 2505.02 of the 
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defendant to take and then refuse medication to warrant a collateral 
appeal.146  Regardless of the dissent’s concerns about the majority’s 
decision, the importance of protecting the personal liberty of a non-
dangerous defendant significantly outweighs a concern for abuse of the 
rule.147 
 
Ohio Revised Code).  Even though the third prong of the Cohen collateral order test is written 
generally, it has been narrowly applied.  Id.  Sellers explains that the Supreme Court in Lauro Lines 
held that “a contractual right to an Italian forum” would not be destroyed if the case commenced to 
trial in New York.  Sellers, supra at 289.  The forum selection clause did not permit the party to 
“avoid suit altogether,” and “while not perfectly secured by appeal after final judgment, the party’s 
right to have the case ultimately decided by a court in Naples was ‘adequately vindicable’ following 
an unnecessary trial in the wrong court.”  Id. (citing Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 495).  See also 2002 
Term: Leading Cases, supra note 134, at 310.  The Sell case is different from the cases of those 
defendants who, according to Justice Scalia’s examples, “appeal from orders regarding electronic 
bracelets, courtroom attire, or compelled testimony.  Though this distinction would not seal future 
appellate jurisdiction at Sell’s four corners, neither would it license a massive ‘disruption of 
criminal proceedings.”’  Id.  But see Heidi Lypps, Better Justice Through Chemistry: Does the new 
Court standard really protect our rights?, RAGGED EDGE EXTRA! (2003), at http://www.ragged-
edge-mag.com/extra/sell-lypps.html.  “[I]t isn’t as if Sell is attempting to avoid trial; he’s been 
insisting he be brought to trial, unmedicated, all along.  Though the decision allows him to avoid the 
indignity of having a needle filled with some very potent drugs shoved into his vein, too, he will 
likely remain incarcerated indefinitely.”  Id.  See also Joseph G. Matye, Interlocutory Appeals of 
Rule 35 Medical Examination Orders,  61 UMKC L. REV. 503, 528 (1993) (suggesting that the 
restrictive application of the interlocutory appeal doctrine is inconsistent with the recognized 
privacy interests related to medical examination and other discovery orders).  Forced medication is 
different from other medical issues, such as discovery orders requiring compliance with a medical 
examination.  Id.  The collateral order doctrine is an unlikely review of a medical examination 
order.  Id.  “In addition to the Seventh Circuit, other courts have completely rejected use of the 
collateral order doctrine to provide jurisdiction to review discovery orders.”  Id. (citing Chase 
Manhattan Bank v. Turner & Newell, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992) and FDIC v. Ernst & 
Whinney, 921 F.2d 83, 85 (6th Cir. 1990) (both showing that while the collateral order doctrine is 
an option for obtaining review, like the other methods, its applicability is very limited)). 
 146. Sell, 539 U.S. at 191.  Justice Scalia explained: 
Today’s narrow holding will allow criminal defendants in petitioner’s position to engage 
in opportunistic behavior. They can, for example, voluntarily take their medication until 
halfway through trial, then abruptly refuse and demand an interlocutory appeal from the 
order that medication continue on a compulsory basis. This sort of concern for the 
disruption of criminal proceedings—strangely missing from the Court’s discussion 
today—is what has led us to state many times that we interpret the collateral-order 
exception narrowly in criminal cases. 
Id. (citing Midland Asphalt Corp., 489 U.S. at 799, and Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 264).  According to 
Justice Scalia, because Dr. Sell did not follow the proper administrative methods and instead chose 
to challenge the order for forced medication through the criminal process, he is required to abide by 
the constraints of such a challenge.  Id. at 193.  These limitations include waiting until the end of the 
trial to challenge an issue such as forced medication.  Id.  “Petitioner’s mistaken litigation strategy, 
and this Court’s desire to decide an interesting constitutional issue, do not justify a disregard of the 
limits that Congress has imposed on courts of appeals’ (and our own) jurisdiction.”  Id. 
 147. Id. at 177.  According to the Majority, considerations such as the severity of the intrusion 
of unwanted medication and the corresponding constitutional issues involved readily distinguish 
[Dr.] Sell’s case from the examples raised by the dissent.  Id. 
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B.  Analyzing the Constitutional Problems with the Court’s Forced 
Medication Test 
Although the Court’s decision ultimately prevented the government 
from forcibly medicating Dr. Sell personally, the heightened scrutiny 
test laid out by the Court is not strong enough to protect many other non-
dangerous mentally ill criminal defendants’ constitutional rights.148 
Sell is the first Supreme Court case involving the mental health 
rights of a non-dangerous pre-trial defendant.149  Unfortunately, the 
Court relied too heavily on two prior precedents, Harper150 and 
Riggins,151 which set forth the Court’s framework for determining the 
answer to this issue.152  The problem with using these two cases lays in 
the issues of dangerousness and seriousness of the offense charged.153  
 
 148. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-81.  The majority in Sell held: “This standard will permit 
involuntary administration of drugs solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances.  But 
those instances may be rare.”  Id. at 180.  The problem with this statement is that some possibility 
still exists that at some point in the future, a mentally ill patient may still be required to succumb to 
unwanted medical treatment solely for the purposes of prosecuting him for a crime.  Petitioner’s 
Brief at 24.  If this is permitted, “an individual will lose his right to refuse medication based solely 
upon the government’s unproven assertion that the individual is guilty of a non-violent crime and 
may be rendered competent if non-specified, mind-altering drugs are administered to him.”  Id.  
According to the Petitioner, constitutionally, this should not be permitted.  Id. 
 149. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 150. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 151. Riggins, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
 152. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177-78. 
 153. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.  The district court found the Magistrate’s 
decision on Dr. Sell’s dangerousness “clearly erroneous,” and the appellate court affirmed this 
holding.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 184.  In addition, the Court distinguished this case from those which 
involve forcibly medicating a dangerous defendant.  Id.  See JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 4:6.4 (1st ed. 2003).  When a 
defendant is deemed dangerous, the court should first explore dangerousness, before getting into an 
analysis regarding trial competency.  Id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-82).  A court does not need to 
consider whether to allow forced medication under the Sell analysis, if the forced medication is 
“warranted for a different purpose.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.  According to the majority, such 
purposes include those: 
set out in Harper related to the individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to the 
individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk. . . . 
There are often strong reasons for a court to determine whether forced administration of 
drugs can be justified on these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence 
question. 
Id. at 182.  In addition, Dr. Sell was charged with nonviolent crimes, such as fraud and money 
laundering.  Id. at 170.  However, Harper was deemed a dangerous defendant and, therefore, the 
Court held that due to the prison environment, 
the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious 
mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to 
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest, where the prison’s 
policy comports with due process requirements. 
Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.  In Riggins, the defendant was on trial for murder, a violent crime.  
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The Harper Court found that a state can forcibly treat an inmate who has 
a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs if he is dangerous to 
himself and the drugs are in his best interest.154  Riggins, although a 
pretrial defendant like Dr. Sell, committed a serious crime like Harper 
and was labeled dangerous to himself and those around him.155  Dr. Sell 
was not deemed dangerous, and the crimes before the Court were non-
dangerous offenses.156  In light of these considerations, the Court should 
have decided that such involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
medication is impermissible and in violation of the Constitution.157 
1.  Sell’s First Amendment Right to Freedom of Thought 
“Does forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render [Dr.] 
Sell competent to stand trial unconstitutionally deprive him of his 
‘liberty’ to reject medical treatment?”158  The Supreme Court missed an 
opportunity to decide this issue on First Amendment grounds.159 
 
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 129.  The Riggins Court repeated Harper by stating that “antipsychotic drugs 
are impermissible unless the inmate posed a danger to himself or others.”  Id. at 135. 
 154. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.  See also MORIARTY, supra note 153, at §4:6.3 (explaining the 
holding in Harper). 
 155. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.  See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Court’s view on Dr. Sell’s dangerousness). 
 156. Sell, 539 U.S. at 173-74.  According to an APA press release: 
In Sell, the Court was asked to clarify the circumstances in which a court may order the 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to a criminal defendant who is 
incompetent to stand trial, but who is competent to make medical decisions on his own 
behalf (including the decision to refuse antipsychotic medication) and who is not 
dangerous to himself or others. 
Court’s Decision in Sell v. United States Reflects Psychology’s Recommendation that Alternatives 
to Drug Therapy Should be Considered, APA PRESS RELEASES (June 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.apa.org/releases/sellvsus.html. 
 157. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.  This assertion is made in opposition to the Court’s decision that 
permits involuntary medication solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances although 
the defendant is deemed non-dangerous.  Id. 
 158. Id. at 177.  See also U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that the Federal Government may not 
“deprive” any person of “liberty . . . without due process of law”). 
 159. The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See also Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Cognitive Liberty & 
Ethics at 3, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) [hereinafter Brief of CCL&E].  
The Center for Cognitive Liberty & Ethics, a civil liberties nonprofit organization that filed a friend 
of the court brief on Dr. Sell’s behalf, “saw an opportunity for the Supreme Court to uphold Dr. 
Sell’s freedom of thought as a First Amendment right.”  Lypps, supra note 145, at 
http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/extra/sell-lypps.html.  To the CCLE, interfering with Dr. Sell’s 
brain chemistry is like mind control, and therefore, a restraint on freedom of speech.  Id.  See 
Supreme Court Upholds Right to Refuse Mind-Altering Drugs: CCLE Amicus Brief Argues Forced 
Medication Infringes Fundamental Liberty, INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH FREEDOM (June 16, 2003) 
29
Schultz: Sell v. United States
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
SCHULTZ1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:11 AM 
532 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:503 
Mental health treatments that “coerce beliefs, attitudes, and mental 
processes” involve potential violations of First Amendment principles.160  
Despite the fact that the First Amendment only mentions speech 
specifically, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that its protection 
does not end at the spoken or written word.”161  The Supreme Court has 
determined that several “corollary rights” are essential to the protections 
of First Amendment free speech, although these rights are not expressly 
provided in the Constitution.162  Freedom of thought has been included 
 
available at http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/news/US_v_Sell_decision.htm. 
The CCLE had urged the Court to consider this case on First Amendment Grounds. . . .  
[The Court] made a good ruling, but they missed a major opportunity to recognize that 
thought is, at least partly, rooted in brain chemistry and that giving the government broad 
powers to directly manipulate the brain chemistry of a non-violent citizen would go 
against our nation’s most cherished values.  The court had a chance to update legal 
thinking about cognition in a way could have been very relevant now and in the coming 
decades. 
Id. 
 160. Bruce J. Winick¸ The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment 
Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (analyzing whether the First Amendment should be 
read to provide constitutional protection against governmentally imposed treatment that interferes 
with mental processes) (citing Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1984) (reasoning 
that because psychotropic drugs could affect the ability to think and communicate, their involuntary 
administration implicates the First Amendment, which implicitly protects the capacity to produce 
ideas); Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that electroconvulsive 
therapy implicates a First Amendment interest “in being able to think and communicate freely”); 
Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding the “involuntary administration of drugs 
which effect mental processes . . . could amount . . . to an interference with . . . rights under the First 
Amendment”); Girouard v. O’Brien, No. 83-3316-O, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4342, at *10 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 4, 1988) (holding that antipsychotic drugs can affect the “ability to think and communicate” 
and therefore implicate the First Amendment); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. 
Mass. 1979) (finding the “right to produce a thought—or refuse to do so” is protected by the First 
Amendment, and is implicated by antipsychotic drugs, which have “the potential to affect and 
change a patient’s mood, attitude and capacity to think”); Kaimowitz v. Mich. Dep’t of Mental 
Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973) (holding that psychosurgery implicates the 
First Amendment by “impairing the power to ‘generate ideas’”)). 
 161. Brief of CCL&E at 4 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (holding that the 
government’s interest in preserving the American flag as a symbol of nationhood did not justify a 
criminal conviction for engaging in political expression)).  “This Court has repeatedly observed that 
there are derivative and corollary rights that are essential to effectuate the purpose of the First 
Amendment, or which are inherent in the rights expressly enumerated in the Amendment.”  Brief of 
CCL&E at 4. 
 162. Jami Floyd, The Administration of Psychotropic Drugs to Prisoners: State of the Law and 
Beyond, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1268-69 (1990) (demonstrating that a competent prisoner has the 
right to refuse psychotropic medication absent the threat of danger to the prison or to others).  See 
JESSE CHOPPER, GILBERT LAW SUMMARIES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 163 (29th ed. 2004).  
According to Chopper, the constitutional scholar: 
The freedoms of speech and association are quite broad.  They include not only the 
freedom to speak and associate, but also the freedom to refrain from speaking and 
associating.  And the freedoms extend not only to speaking and associating; they also 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/7
SCHULTZ1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:11 AM 
2005] SELL V. UNITED STATES 533 
in these additional protections.163  The Supreme Court has noted that “at 
the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that . . . one’s beliefs 
should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by 
the State.”164 
In Sell, the government sought to modify the way in which Dr. Sell 
thinks by directly altering the chemistry of his brain.165  Despite the 
seriousness of the request, the government could not provide conclusive 
evidence that the medication would render Dr. Sell competent, let alone 
 
may extend to conduct related to speech and association. 
Id.  See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982) (acknowledging the right to 
receive information and ideas); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) (approving of the right 
to make a monetary contribution for the purpose of spreading a political message); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (recognizing freedom of association). 
 163. See Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1367 (“The capacity to think and decide is a fundamental 
element of freedom . . . whatever powers the Constitution has granted our government, involuntary 
mind control is not one of them . . . .”).  See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940) (recognizing a freedom to believe, and subsequently a freedom to act); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (finding a person’s freedom to think 
however he wishes indispensable to the search and dissemination of truth), overruled by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 479 (1969) (finding that the Whitney court condemned 
syndicalism law in regards to free speech by an overly broad interpretation).  See also Brief of 
CCL&E at 4 (“Repeatedly, this Court has recognized that freedom of thought is one of the most 
elementary and important rights inherent in the First Amendment.”). 
 164. Floyd, supra note 162, at 1268-69 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
234-35 (1977) and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (holding that “[o]ur whole 
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control individuals’ 
minds . . . a right of the state to control the moral content of a person’s thoughts,” the Court noted, 
was “wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment”)).  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (holding that “the right to think is the beginning of 
freedom”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985) (stating “the individual’s freedom of 
conscious [is] the central liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First Amendment”); West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (stating that at the center of 
our American freedom, is the “freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse”).  See also 
Lypps, supra note 145, at http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/extra/sell-lypps.html. 
The idea of an altered mental state forced on us against our will haunts our culture: the 
popularity of books like 1984 and Brave New World, not to mention films like Jacob’s 
Ladder and The Matrix, testify to this recurrent fear. Pharmacology and psychiatry are 
easy routes for this sort of abuse of power; in fact, in the former Soviet Union, dissidents 
were often declared insane, then drugged and imprisoned in psychiatric hospitals to keep 
them quiet. 
Id. 
 165. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185.  See infra notes 194, 196, 197 & 199 and accompanying text.  See 
also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134 (holding that antipsychotic drugs, by their very nature, work by 
altering the chemistry in the brain).  See generally Aaron M. Nance, Balking at Buying What the 
Eighth Circuit is Sell-ing: United States v. Sell and the Involuntary Medication of Incompetent, 
Non-Dangerous, Pretrial Detainees Cloaked with the Presumption of Innocence, 71 UMKC L. REV. 
685, 688 (2003) (incompetent pretrial detainees should be civilly committed until they regain 
competence by some means other than injection). 
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lack side effects that could cause him permanent harm.166 
Although antipsychotic medications are often useful in assuaging 
the psychotic symptoms of mental disorders,167 not all people with such 
problems have conditions that respond to these drugs.168  In fact, Dr. Sell 
 
 166. Petitioner’s Brief at 29.  But see Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law at 25, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (No. 02-
5644).  “The medications, when appropriate, aim to clear the hallucinations and delusions produced 
by psychosis, or to allow the patient to recognize and control their dominating influence.”  Id.  In 
essence, these medications clear the mind and allow freer speech than the defendant would have in 
an unmedicated state.  Id. 
 167. See PHILIP JANICAK, ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHOPARMACOTHERAPY 
110-133 (2d ed. 1997).  See also Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould et al., Article: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless 
Oxymoron or Path to Redemption, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 80 (1995) (arguing that litigants 
representing mentally disabled individuals should look more closely to therapeutic jurisprudence as 
a source for their clients’ legal rights).  Compare Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: 
Mental Patients’ Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 461, 461 (1977) (“Despite almost 
four decades of research and clinical studies, however, there is still no generally accepted theory on 
how the drugs achieve their claimed effects on mental illness, nor is there agreement as to the 
precise mental conditions for which treatment with the drugs is effective.”), with E. FULLER 
TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR FAMILIES, CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS 175 
(3d ed. 1995) (explaining that antipsychotic drugs are effective, especially for patients with 
schizophrenia: nearly seventy percent of patients with schizophrenia experience clear improvement 
from the use of antipsychotic drugs, twenty-five percent of patients experience little or no 
improvement, and five percent get worse).  See generally Thomas A. Bickers, Comment: Psychiatry 
with a Conscience: A Survey of the Right to Control Psychotropic Medication and the Involuntarily 
Committed Mental Patient, 54 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1986) (examining the right of involuntarily 
committed mental patients to control treatment with psychotropic medication, looking at both 
judicial and legislative responses); James A. King, Comment: An Involuntary Mental Patient’s 
Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic Drugs: A Reassessment, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135 (1987) 
(proposing a more limited right of an involuntary mental patient to refuse treatment with 
antipsychotic drugs).  But see William T. Carpenter & Robert W. Buchanan, Schizophrenia, 330 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 681, 686-87 (1994) (observing that antipsychotic drugs tend to be more dramatic 
and effective in the short and intermediate terms, and less so in the long term; suggesting that 
between 10 percent and 20 percent of patients have a poor response to antipsychotic drugs). 
 168. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 16, Sell v. United States, 
539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) [hereinafter American Psychological Associate Brief].  
“[D]ifferent psychotic disorders respond differently to medication.”  Id.  Dr. Sell had delusional 
disorder, persecutory type, which is in stark contract to schizophrenia.  Id.  Hallucinations, although 
the primary symptom of schizophrenia, are not always found in a patient with delusional disorder.  
Id.  Currently, no consensus exists as to whether delusional disorder, persecutory type responds 
positively to medication.  Id.  See Alan Felthous, Are Persecutory Delusions Amenable to 
Treatment?, 29 AM. ACAD. PSYCH. L. 461, 465 (2001) (discussing studies of delusional disorder 
and the implications for doctors concerned with the treatment and care of offenders suffering from 
these disorders).  According to Felthous, pure persecutory delusions are “hopelessly resistant to 
treatment” and “there have been no controlled studies of specific agents in the treatment of 
delusional disorders.”  Id.  See also Hernan Silva, Effects of Primozide on the Psychopathology of 
Delusional Disorder, 22 PROG. NEURO-PSYCHOPARMACOL. & BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 331 (1998) 
(finding pimozide ineffective in treating delusional disorder). 
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/7
SCHULTZ1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:11 AM 
2005] SELL V. UNITED STATES 535 
had reacted negatively to antipsychotic medication in the past.169  In 
light of the seriousness of the First Amendment right to freedom of 
thought at stake, the Court should have recognized that no governmental 
interest can outweigh a person’s right to freedom of thought, especially 
when the defendant is non-dangerous and charged with non-violent 
crimes. 
2.  Sell’s Fundamental Right to Privacy 
Generally, “fundamental rights are those explicitly guaranteed by 
the Bill of Rights or otherwise implied but not expressly articulated in 
the Constitution’s text.”170  In order to determine whether a right is 
constitutionally fundamental, the Supreme Court has used the tests laid 
out in two milestone decisions.171  The first of these decisions, Palko v. 
Connecticut, described fundamental liberties as those “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would 
exist if [they] were sacrificed.”172  The second decision, Moore v. City of 
 
 169. Transcript of Oral Argument, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), 
available in 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 21, at 22 (Mar. 3, 2003) (response of Attorney Barry Short). 
[Sell] has had experience with antipsychotic drugs.  He took Haldol in the 1980’s.  He 
had an attack of acute dystonia, which this Court has recognized as being a serious side 
effect in at least three cases, Harper, Riggins, and Mills.  He also has a psychiatrist that 
has told him that antipsychotic drugs will not work on delusional disorders. 
Id. 
 170. G. Steven Neeley, The Constitutional Right to Suicide, The Quality of Life, and The 
“Slippery-Slope”: An Explicit Reply To Lingering Concerns, 28 AKRON L. REV. 53, 76 n.16 (1994) 
(contending that slippery slope arguments against recognizing a right to suicide are logically 
fallacious).  For the various inquiries made when searching for substantive due process rights, see 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-4 (2d ed. 1988).  For an excellent and 
comprehensive catalogue of various methods for discovering unenumerated fundamental rights, see 
generally David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? 
Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 806 (1996) 
(describing how the Supreme Court seeks to identify unenumerated fundamental rights).  Crump 
explains: 
Textually, from the beginning, there was the Ninth Amendment. Then, too, there were 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
as well as other parts of the Bill of Rights. And all along, there were structural 
arguments, as well as arguments based upon the nature of the entire document as a plan 
for limited government or protection of natural rights. There were the source documents 
from which ideas were borrowed, the debates by the Founders, and other interpretive 
writings. These and other sources ultimately ripened into judicial decisions recognizing 
interests of individuals strong enough to overcome otherwise legitimate actions by 
government, even absent explicit directions in the text. These are the sources of 
unenumerated fundamental rights. 
Id. 
 171. Neeley, supra note 170, at 76. 
 172. Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (holding that the Double 
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East Cleveland, characterized fundamental rights as those liberties that 
are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”173 
Regardless of the test used, a fundamental right is the highest 
benchmark of American liberty.174  The Supreme Court has found that 
the right to privacy comes within the penumbra of the First, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments and is, therefore, considered fundamental.175  
Derived from the right to privacy is “the right to choose to undergo or 
terminate medical treatment, even if the treatment is life-sustaining.”176 
The Sixth Circuit correctly decided United States v. Brandon, when 
it chose strict scrutiny as the applicable standard of review when the 
government sought to forcibly inject an incompetent, non-dangerous, 
pre-trial detainee charged with a non-violent crime.177  The court found 
 
Jeopardy Clause applies only against the federal government)).  See also Leslie A. Leatherwood, 
Sanity in Alaska: A Constitutional Assessment of the Insanity Defense Statute, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 
65, 75 (1993) (arguing that Alaska’s insanity statute violates due process).  In determining whether 
a doctrine is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, “the proper focus . . . is the pervasiveness of 
the doctrine in the history of the common law.”  Id. 
 173. Neeley, supra note 170, at 76 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977) (finding that the city’s housing ordinance, which categorized a second grandchild living in 
appellant’s home as an illegal occupant, violated the Due Process Clause)).  See also Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (applying the ‘firmly rooted in the nation’s history’ test to a 
fundamental right and thus finding no fundamental right involved) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (detailing the firmly rooted test to determine a fundamental right)). 
 174. See Nance, supra note 165, at 688.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 
(1965) (finding fundamental right to procreate); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) 
(finding fundamental right to procreate); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding 
fundamental right to marry); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (finding quasi-fundamental 
right to education); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (finding 
fundamental right to vote); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (finding fundamental 
right to marry); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (finding fundamental right to 
interstate travel). 
 175. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (finding a right of privacy implicit in “the Third 
Amendment’s prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment’s right of 
people to be secure in their persons, the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, and the 
Ninth Amendment’s right to retain rights not enumerated in the Constitution”).  See, e.g., Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit 
making private possession of obscene material a crime, and that the States’ power to regulate 
obscenity does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home). 
 176. William A. Krais, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person’s Right of Self-
Determination: Right-to-Die, Sterilization and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J. L. & MED. 333, 347 
(1989) (examining the procedural safeguards necessary to protect the constitutional rights of the 
developmentally disabled) (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) (“Presumably this 
right [of privacy] is broad enough to encompass a patient’s decision to decline medical treatment 
under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions”)). 
 177. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998).  On October 1, 1996, Brandon was indicted for 
violating federal law by sending a threatening communication through the mail.  Id. at 949-50.  
Brandon was a pretrial detainee who sought a judicial hearing on the issue of whether he could be 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/7
SCHULTZ1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:11 AM 
2005] SELL V. UNITED STATES 537 
the right to be free from bodily intrusion fundamental and determined 
that the forced medication was allowed only if it was “narrowly tailored 
to a compelling governmental interest.”178  Therefore, when a state’s 
practice infringes on a fundamental right, the strict scrutiny analysis is 
applied.179  The Brandon court held that an individual has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic drugs, a liberty that only an essential or 
overriding state interest might overcome.180  This standard is more 
difficult to meet than the somewhat-heightened-scrutiny standard created 
by the Sell Court for such situations and should be applied to cases in 
which the defendant is found non-dangerous.181  The Sell Court’s 
heightened scrutiny standard still permits some mentally ill defendants to 
 
“forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs to render him competent to stand trial.”  Id. at 947.  
After much exploration into different approaches to standard of review, the court in Brandon held, 
“For all of the reasons stated above, we conclude that the decision to medicate a non-dangerous 
pretrial detainee must survive strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 960 (emphasis added).  The court went through 
an extensive analysis of past cases in making their determination for the standard of review.  Id. at 
957-61.  This reasoning should have been followed by the Court in Sell.  The appeals court in Seal 
v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000), cited Brandon in stating that “government actions 
that burden the exercise of those fundamental rights or liberty interests are subject to strict scrutiny, 
and will be upheld only when they are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.”  Id.  
See also Angelina N. McDonald, In Search of a Standard of Review: Decisions to Forcibly 
Medicate Pre-Trial Detainees In Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 285 (2003) (arguing 
that Riggins does not provide a standard by which to review the forced medication of pre-trial 
detainees) (citing Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir.1984) (adopting a strict-scrutiny 
test for decisions to medicate pretrial detainees and questioning whether the government’s interest 
in rendering them fit for trial alone is ever sufficient to support involuntary medication)). 
 178. Nance, supra note 165, at 716 n.62 (citing Brandon, 158 F.3d at 957). 
 179. See Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility: The 
Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment after Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 
117, 134 (1999) (recommending a revised constitutional standard for evaluating civil commitment 
laws).  “Under traditional due process analysis, a court’s characterization of a right as fundamental 
should trigger strict scrutiny, requiring a law that deprives that right to be ‘narrowly tailored’ and to 
further a ‘compelling government interest.’”  Id. (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976 (1996) 
(holding that the voting districts exhibited a level of racial manipulation that exceeded what was 
allowed under the Voting Rights Act)).  The Fourteenth Amendment “forbids the government to 
infringe on certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless 
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”  See also Nance, supra 
note 165, at 695.  “In strict scrutiny analysis, according to Brandon, the State interest must be 
‘sufficiently weighty to override a fundamental right in general, without attention to the specific 
fundamental right implicated.’”  Id.  To justify invading First Amendment rights, the state must 
have a compelling reason.  Id. 
 180. Nance, supra note 165, at 695 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134).  “The forcible injection of 
medication into a non-consenting person’s body . . . represents a substantial interference with that 
person’s liberty.”  Harper, 494 U.S. at 229 (holding that when the interference deals with 
antipsychotic drugs, it is more severe).   
 181. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81. 
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be forcibly medicated, and thus violates their constitutional rights.182 
3.  Dr. Sell’s Right to a Fair Trial 
In addition to due process and First Amendment rights, Dr. Sell 
also has a right to a fair trial.183  If the right to a fair trial had been the 
only argument made by the defense, the Court may have been justified 
in setting out the four-prong test for forcible medication.  This 
subsection considers the Court’s decision in light of the fair trial claims 
only, disregarding the previous two arguments.184 
Due to modern technology and the advent of new kinds of 
medicine, the government is seemingly now able to “exercise control 
over a criminal defendant’s mind at a critical time of his life: while on 
trial for a serious offense.”185  Legally, in addition to the potential for 
physical problems, the forcible injection puts a defendant’s 
constitutional trial rights in jeopardy.186  Simply put, Dr. Sell has four 
 
 182. See infra notes 200-31 and accompanying text for a discussion on the problems with the 
heightened scrutiny standard of the Sell Court. 
 183. U.S. CONST. amends. V & VI.  The Fifth Amendment reads: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend V.  The Sixth Amendment reads: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 184. See infra notes 182-99 and accompanying text for a discussion on constitutional issues 
missed by the Court. 
 185. Nance, supra note 165, at 711.  Jami Floyd makes an interesting observation of the 
government’s insistence on medicating these defendants: “With our nation immersed in ‘the war on 
drugs,’ it is ironic that . . . the Supreme Court heard a case in which a state government sought not 
to curtail an individual’s drug use, but forcibly to administer drugs to that individual.”  Floyd, supra 
note 162, at 1243. 
 186. American Psychological Association Brief at 25.  Dr. Sell’s Fifth Amendment due process 
rights were also considered, because he did spend five years in jails and psychiatric hospitals 
without trial.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 186.  The decision says that Dr. Sell’s liberty would be infringed by 
the prospect of forced medication; and that the government’s “important” interest in bringing him to 
trial was compromised by Dr. Sell’s lengthy confinement.  Id.  See also Lypps, supra note 145, at 
http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/extra/sell-lypps.html.  Lypps explains: 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion takes this into account, suggesting that the time Sell 
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distinct trial rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.187  He has the 
right to present a defense,188 not to have the government manipulate his 
appearance in a way that prejudices him before a jury,189 to refrain from 
trial unless competent to consult and assist in his defense190 and to testify 
in his defense in his own words.191  Trying Dr. Sell in a state of 
compulsory medication would violate all of these rights.192 
By administering medication, the State may be creating a prejudicial 
negative demeanor in the defendant making him look nervous and 
restless, for example, or so calm or sedated as to appear bored, cold, 
unfeeling, and unresponsive. . . .  That such effects may be subtle does 
not make them any less real or potentially influential.193 
Physically, the effects may prejudice a jury, and mentally, he may not be 
able to communicate and act naturally. 194 
 
has spent in the US Medical Center for Federal Prisoners would count as “time served,” 
and noting that Sell has already served more time than his maximum sentence for fraud 
ever would have been. But the thundering silence of the Court on the issue of a 
defendant’s freedom of thought frustrated those who had urged the court to hand down a 
decision protecting the mental autonomy of pre-trial defendants. 
Id. 
 187. Petitioner’s Brief at 43. 
 188. Id.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(b) (setting forth rules for notice regarding expert evidence 
of a medical condition).  The rule states:  
If a defendant intends to introduce expert evidence relating to a mental disease or defect 
or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing on either (1) the issue of guilt or 
(2) the issue of punishment in a capital case, the defendant must—within the time 
provided for filing a pretrial motion or at any later time the court sets—notify an attorney 
for the government in writing of this intention and file a copy of the notice with the 
clerk. 
Id. 
 189. Petitioner’s Brief at 43 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345 (1970) (discussing a 
defendant’s right to act like himself at trial)). 
 190. Id. (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a 
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object 
of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may 
not be subjected to a trial.”)). 
 191. Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (holding that there is no current 
justification for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity to offer his own testimony)).  The 
Court in Rock also pointed out that, in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (holding that 
a state cannot constitutionally force a lawyer upon defendant who voluntarily exercised his right to 
self representation), the Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally the right to make his 
defense.  It is the accused, not counsel, who must be ‘informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation,’ who must be ‘confronted with the witnesses against him,’ and who must be accorded 
‘compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’”  Rock, 483 U.S. 52 (emphasis added). 
 192. Petitioner’s Brief at 43. 
 193. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for the American 
Psychiatric Association at 13, Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466)). 
 194. Nance, supra note 165, at 711.  For an illustration of the effects of medicating a 
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Antipsychotic medications have the potential to impair a 
defendant’s fair trial rights in at least three different ways.195  First, 
antipsychotic drugs can have “a sedation-like effect and frequent side 
effects are drowsiness, apathy, and listlessness.”196  Second, “the drugs’ 
physical manifestations, such as repetitive, involuntary tic-like 
movements of the face, eyelids, and mouth, undeniably would have a 
negative effect on a jury’s perception of the defendant.”197  Finally, one 
of the most serious constitutional violations that may occur due to 
forcible medication is the denial of the defendant’s right to present a 
defense to the charges against him.198  Each of these symptoms may 
have a negative effect on Dr. Sell’s defense and chances at prevailing at 
trial because they are prejudicial to his case.199 
 
defendant, see id., at 712.  There, Nance argues: 
No one could seriously doubt that the right to a fair trial would be compromised if, for 
example, the prosecution chemically manipulated the very properties and operational 
structure of an “incompetent” DNA sample in order to render it “competent” evidence 
available for presentation to a jury.  Such is the functional equivalent of what occurs 
when a defendant is injected with antipsychotic drugs before he is presented to a jury.  
Such State action manipulating the mind of its defendant opponent and his deeply 
ingrained trial rights could end the analysis as a matter of general legal principle. 
Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Beth Braby, Recent Developments: A Criminal Defendant’s Right To Refuse Antipsychotic 
Medication, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 549 (1993) (arguing that a criminal defendant who may 
not be competent to stand trial without medication is allowed to waive his right to be competent 
when pleading the insanity defense) (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143).  See also Thomas R.E. Barnes 
& J. Guy Edwards, The Side-Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs. I. CNS and Neuromuscular Effects, 
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS AND THEIR SIDE-EFFECTS 213, 217 (1993) (explaining that conditions such 
as Parkinsonism which resembles the effects of Parkinson’s disease with slowed motor skills and a 
mask-like face are caused by antipsychotic medications). 
 197. Nance, supra note 165, at 712.  See American Psychological Association Brief at 25.  
Other conditions may result from taking antipsychotic medication, such as Akathisia, Dystonia, and 
Tardive Dyskinesia.  Id. at 20.  Akathisia is a restless feeling in which a person feels like he must be 
in constant motion.  Id. at 21. People with Akathisia often pace repeatedly or tap their foot 
incessantly.  Id.  Dystonia involves more severe spasms of the head and neck, and often includes 
facial grimacing and eye rolling.  Id.  Tardive Dyskinesia is a potentially irreversible condition in 
which a person has facial, oral, lower extremity and trunk spasms.  Id. 
 198. Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial in 
Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1986) 
(arguing that the state’s interest in assuring the defendant’s competency must give way if the 
defendant chooses to waive the right to be tried while competent).  See also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 
138. 
 199. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) (holding that Due Process requires the state 
to provide an indigent defendant with access to a psychiatrist to assist in the preparation of an 
insanity defense).  In his brief to the Supreme Court, defendant Ake called into question the lower 
court’s ruling on fitness.  Id.  He argued that the drug had rendered him unable and unwilling to 
assist his counsel and had altered his demeanor so as to prejudice him in the eyes of the jury.  Id.  
The brief stressed his “subjective feeling of isolation and uninvolvement” and “zombie-like 
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4.  Analyzing the Court’s Heightened Scrutiny Standard 
The Court determined that when a mentally incompetent defendant 
is not dangerous and the government wants to medicate him for the sole 
purpose of trial competency, four factors must be considered.200  In light 
of all the factors laid out by the Court in Sell, the majority stated that it 
would still be difficult for the government to forcibly medicate a non-
dangerous defendant.201  This analysis would have been sufficient to 
justify forced medication in certain limited situations had the Court only 
been faced with the issues of fair trial; however, in light of the other 
constitutional issues at stake, this standard is sub par. 
a.  Necessary to further important government trial-related 
interests 
The Court determined that the government must have important 
interests at stake in order to consider forcible medication solely on the 
 
appearance.”  Id.  Because the Court reversed Ake’s conviction on other grounds, it did not reach 
the issue of forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.  Id.  See also Steve Tomashefsky, 
Antipsychotic Drugs and Fitness to Stand Trial: The Right of the Unfit Accused to Refuse 
Treatment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 773, 787-88 (1985) (proposing a new framework for resolving the 
problems raised by the interplay between the fitness standard and the use of antipsychotic drugs). 
Antipsychotic drugs may produce a markedly passive and apathetic or “zombie-like” 
appearance as a result of suppressed emotionalism.  Antipsychotic drugs may also cause 
profuse sweating, muscular tics, difficulty in swallowing, a shuffling gait, and an 
extremely disquieting tendency toward spasmodic eye-rolling and neck-twisting.  These 
effects are of special concern to criminal defendants to the extent that altered 
appearance, idiosyncratic movements, drowsiness, and unnatural rigidity may have a 
distracting or misleading effect on the trier of fact.  They may also have an effect on 
witnesses: if a witness might be tempted to lie about an absent defendant, he might also 
be tempted to lie about an unusually placid or distant one. 
Id. 
 200. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.  See also MORIARTY, supra note 153, at § 4:6.4 (discussing the 
four standards set out by the Court in Sell). 
 201. Patricia Gray, Finding Middle Ground: Compelling the Use of Psychotropic Medications 
for Pretrial Detainees, at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/Mental/030721.pdf.  
According to Attorney Patricia Gray, 
The Supreme Court ruled that although a criminal defendant may be involuntarily 
medicated under certain circumstances, those circumstances will be rare. The opinion 
further states that medication solely for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent 
to stand trial, absent the factors outlined by the majority, will not be sustained. In 
particular, the Court directs that there must first be an inquiry into why a specific 
defendant needs medication, especially if there is no finding that he represents a danger 
to himself or others. The Court also seemed loath to override a defendant’s refusal to 
accept medication if the term of confinement for treatment was near or equal to any 
sentence the defendant might receive if convicted. 
Id. 
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grounds of trial competency.202  By substituting the word “important” for 
“compelling,” the Court relaxed the strict scrutiny analysis that it should 
have used.203  Compelling interests are higher and require a stronger 
showing on the part of the government.204 
The Court insists on a balance of the government’s interest in 
timely prosecution205 and protection of the defendant’s Sixth 
 
 202. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added).  See also United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 86 
(2d Cir. 2003), vacated by 539 U.S. 939 (2003).  “While the government has a strong interest in 
prosecuting all crime, some prosecutions are simply so minor that, in the absence of some unusual 
compelling reason, they ordinarily will not outweigh a defendant’s interests in avoiding involuntary 
medication.”  Id. 
 203. Michael H. Shapiro, Genes and the Just Society: Does Technological Enhancement of 
Human Traits Threaten Human Equality and Democracy?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 769, 842 n.133 
(2002) (outlining some of the moral, legal, and general policy difficulties that societies and 
individuals will face if technological enhancements via germ line and somatic mechanisms become 
possible).  “Heightened scrutiny comes in several varieties that are not always so named. The most 
rigorous form is strict scrutiny, requiring governments to establish that their intrusions on 
fundamental liberty interests are necessary to promote compelling state interests (or at least those 
compelling interests in fact relied on by the government in enacting and implementing the measures 
in question).”  Id.  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-36 (1969).  See generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.5 (1997) (finding lesser 
forms of scrutiny still require a showing that the government’s identified interests are important and 
that the means selected to further them are reasonably narrowed so as to promote them without 
undue impingement on the liberty interest, that is, efficiently).  But Shapiro also points out that the 
Court is not always clear on what standard of review it is using, and it is sometimes affirmatively 
misleading: “For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has on several occasions invoked the language 
of the minimal rational basis test to strike down classifications it thought were particularly unfair to 
vulnerable groups, without holding that any suspect classification or fundamental liberty interest 
was involved.”  Id.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating a state 
constitutional amendment that prohibited all governmental action at any level intended to protect 
gay persons from discrimination, and subsequently applying the rational basis test); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 473 (1985) (striking down a refusal to grant a 
special use permit under local zoning law for a facility housing mentally retarded persons, 
purportedly applying the rational basis test); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (finding no 
rational basis for denying a free public education to “undocumented children”).  For more on due 
process issues, see Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138 (granting a defendant a liberty interest in avoiding 
unwanted antipsychotic drugs and requiring that the state demonstrate that compelling concerns 
outweighed the interest in freedom from receiving unwanted antipsychotic drugs, and remanding the 
case for determination of whether there were reasonable alternatives to forced medication).  Justice 
O’Connor denied that she applied strict scrutiny.  Id. at 136. Justice Thomas complained that she 
had indeed improperly done so.  Id. at 156 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 204. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.  See also YAHOO!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contre 
Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (explaining that the 
Constitution does not allow restrictions on speech unless there is a compelling government interest, 
for example avoiding a clear and present danger of imminent violence). 
 205. See also Brian P. Brooks, A New Speedy Trial Standard for Barker v Wingo: Reviving a 
Constitutional Remedy in an Age of Statutes, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 598-599 (1994) (arguing for 
the revival of a constitutional speedy act remedy).  Society has three distinct interests in ensuring 
that defendants receive a speedy trial.  Id.  The first interest is in the effective prosecution of 
criminal cases.  Id.  Second, society has an interest in preventing an accused who is not incarcerated 
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Amendment right to a fair and speedy trial.206  The governmental 
interests in question include bringing a person accused of a serious crime 
to trial.207  Never before has the Court allowed such an invasion merely 
to prosecute.208  Only in the cases in which the mentally ill person is in 
danger or puts others in danger has the Court found a justification for 
forcible medication.209  The government, in such cases, seeks to protect 
people’s need for security.210  The Court, however, states that the 
individual facts of each case must be considered in determining the 
government’s interest in prosecution, therefore leaving open the 
opportunity to refuse administration of the medication.211 
 
from committing additional criminal acts while awaiting trial.  Id.  Society’s third speedy trial 
interest lays in reducing the wasted cost of pretrial incarceration for defendants who will ultimately 
be acquitted.  Id. 
 206. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  After a significant passage of time, evidence may be lost which 
would aid the successful prosecution of the crime.  Id.  See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Id. 
 207. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  In Riggins, the Court noted that the government has a compelling 
interest in bringing a defendant to trial after probable cause has been found to justify prosecution for 
a serious criminal offense.  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135-36. 
 208. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001) (holding that an intrusion solely for 
prosecution has not been allowed). 
 209. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.  See Petitioner’s Brief at 37.  “The safety interest present in 
Riggins is not present in Dr. Sell’s case.”  Id.  But see Transcript of Oral Argument, Sell v. United 
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), available in 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 21 (Mar. 3, 
2003) (discussing Dr. Sell’s subsequent, yet non-included charges for attempted murder of an 
officer and former employee); United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 568 n.8 (8th Cir. 2002).   
Although Sell is also charged with conspiring to murder an FBI officer and a witness, we 
base our reasoning solely on the seriousness of the fraud charges.  It is possible that 
Sell’s threats after his first indictment were a manifestation of his delusional disorder and 
we decline to make a determination about whether those charges suffice to involuntarily 
medicate him. 
Id.  See also Sell, 539 U.S. at 183-84.  “We shall assume that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion 
about Sell’s dangerousness was correct.  But we make the assumption only because the Government 
did not contest, and the parties have not argued, that particular matter.  If anything, the record . . . 
suggests the contrary.”  Id. at 184. 
 210. Id. at 180 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135-36). 
 211. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  The Court explained that “special circumstances” may weaken the 
Government’s interest in prosecution.  Id.   
While the interest in prosecution of serious crimes is an important interest, a case by case 
inquiry is necessary to see if that interest is mitigated in any particular case by the 
prospect of long civil confinement for the psychiatric condition, or because of long 
periods of confinement already served, which would be subtracted from any eventual 
sentence. 
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The Sell Court noted that the government has a “constitutionally 
essential interest in assuring the defendant’s trial is a fair one.”212  
Because Dr. Sell correctly pointed out that forced medication would 
render his trial unfair, the government’s interest in this case can never be 
important enough to override the defendant’s constitutionally protected 
rights.213  In addition, the Court submitted for consideration on remand 
that the government must take into account the fact that since Dr. Sell 
had been confined during the pendancy of this case, and that since 18 
U.S.C. § 3585(b) grants credit to a defendant for time served, Dr. Sell 
may have already paid the price for his crimes.214 
b.  Balance of significant government interests versus side 
effects that may undermine the trial’s fairness 
As already noted, antipsychotic medications can have serious 
effects on a defendant’s right to a fair trial.215  These medications are 
broken down into two categories: older conventional drugs and the more 
recent atypical medications.216  The side effects of these categories of 
drugs are different in nature and severity.217  In Sell, the dilemma of 
 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Prisoners Can Be Forced To Take Anti-Psychotic Drugs: Commentary 
on Sell v. United States, DUKE LAW, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/ 
supremecourtonline/commentary/selvuni.html.  Schroeder notes that in Dr. Sell’s case, he had been 
confined for a longer period than the sentence he would receive from conviction on the original 
indictment at the time of the trial.  Id. 
 212. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
 213. See supra notes 183-99 and accompanying text on Dr. Sell’s right to a fair trial. 
 214. Sell, 539 U.S. at 186.  See also Transcript of Oral Argument, Sell v. United States, 539 
U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), available in 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 21, at 36-37 (Mar. 3, 2003).  
Justice Stevens asked the government “Is the amount of time he’s already been in custody, as 
compared to the potential sentence he might receive, relevant to the analysis?”  Id.  Attorney 
Dreeben replied, “It may be, Justice Stevens, relevant to the analysis to the extent that courts have 
held that the amount of time that a person can be held for treatment under 4241(d) cannot exceed 
the ultimate sentence that they would receive.”  Id. 
 215. See supra notes 190, 194, 196-97, 199 and accompanying text. 
 216. American Psychological Association Brief at 20 n.17.  “Conventional antipsychotic drugs 
include, among others, haloperidol (Haldol), thiothixene (Navane), chlorpromazine (Thorazine), and 
thioridazine (Mellaril).  Atypical drugs include clozapine (Clozaril), risperidone (Risperdal), 
olanzapine (Zyprexa), quetiapine (Seroquel), and ziprasidone (Geodon).”  Id.  See generally 
PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE (54th ed. 2000). 
 217. See supra notes 190, 194, 196-97, 199 and accompanying text.  In addition, the 
conventional antipsychotics can cause “sedation, blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, constipation, 
urine retention, orthostatic hypertension (low blood pressure when standing), tachycardia (rapid 
beating of the heart, weakness, and dizziness).” American Psychological Association Brief at 21.  
The traditional antipsychotic medications may also cause the fatal disorder, neuroleptic malignant 
syndrome.  Id. at 21 n.20.  To the contrary, the newer category of medications, although not 
completely risk-free, seem to have better results with side-effects.  Id.  Because they are still capable 
of creating a plethora of problems from the disappearance of white blood cells to cataracts, these 
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differing side effects was particularly problematic because the 
government refused to reveal the precise drug it intended to use to 
medicate Dr. Sell.218 
Because the lower courts focused mostly on the dangerousness 
issue, the Supreme Court was unable to determine whether the side 
effects of antipsychotic medication were likely to undermine the fairness 
of Dr. Sell’s trial.219  This is problematic for future cases and mentally ill 
defendants because the issue of side effects must still be resolved.220 
c.  Less intrusive alternatives unavailable 
Third, the court must find that any alternative, less intrusive 
treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.221  
Additionally, the court must reflect on less intrusive means for drug 
administration prior to considering more intrusive methods.222  Due to 
the importance of the personal and constitutional concerns at stake for 
Dr. Sell, the court should not order involuntary administration of 
medication without first attempting non-drug based treatment 
methods.223  These alternatives are important, when the aim is helping 
the person recover functional abilities such as assisting his attorney 
during trial.224 
The Court should insist that the government prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that no other methods for restoring competency 
 
drugs are still risky for patients.  Id.  See John Gedes, Atypical Antipsychotics in the Treatment of 
Schizophrenia: Systematic Overview and Meta-Regression Analysis, 321 BRITISH MED. J. 1371, 
1371 (2000).  “There is no clear evidence that [the newer] atypical antipsychotics are more effective 
or are better tolerated than conventional antipsychotics [in treating symptoms of psychosis].”  Id. 
 218. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 569 (8th Cir. 2002).  See also Nance, supra note 165.  
Dr. Sell argued that the lower court erred in finding medical appropriateness because the 
government failed to disclose which medication it would use on him.  Sell, 282 F.3d at 570.  Dr. 
Sell claimed that without knowing which drugs would be administered, he was incapable of making 
anything more than a generalized argument.  Id.  See United States v. Sell, No. 4:98CR177 at 7 
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 4, 2001) (upholding Magistrate’s order allowing the involuntarily medication of Dr. 
Sell and stating that Dr. Sell’s arguments against medication were generalized).  In response, Dr. 
Wolfson of the government stated that he did not want to be “pinned down” to a single drug because 
he hoped to leave some of the choice up to Dr. Sell.  Sell, 282 F.3d at 570.  He recommended that 
the drugs Quetiapine or Olanzapine be used.  Id. 
 219. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185-86. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See APA PRESS RELEASES, supra note 156, available at http://www.apa.org/releases/ 
sellvsus.html.  According to Nathalie F. P. Gilfoyle, General Counsel for the APA, “The bottom line 
is that—thanks to APA’s submission—the Court has specifically required that trial courts consider 
and rule out nondrug alternatives before ordering involuntary drug treatment.”  Id. 
 222. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (citing American Psychological Association Brief at 13-22). 
 223. American Psychological Association Brief at 10. 
 224. Id. at 12. 
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exist other than medication.225  The Sell Court did not require the 
government to prove it had exhausted alternative methods of regaining 
competency by a clear and convincing evidence standard and, therefore, 
left too much discretion in the hands of the court.226 
d.  Medical appropriateness 
The Court found that in order to forcibly medicate, the final 
obstacle is determining the patient’s best interest.227  To effectively 
determine whether the proposed treatment is medically appropriate, it is 
important for the trial court to consider the exact characteristics of the 
defendant’s disorder.228 
In Sell, however, “best interest” is hard to attain because the experts 
in the case did not agree on the possible success or potential side effects 
caused by the treatment;229 nor did they determine the specific 
 
 225. Id. at 10.  “Moreover, where the expert testimony does not clearly eliminate the possibility 
that other non-drug approaches may be effacious . . . they should be attempted in an effort to 
determine whether medication is truly necessary to maintain the defendant’s competency.”  Id.  The 
clear and convincing standard requires evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly 
probable or reasonably certain.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999).  It requires a 
greater level of proof than preponderance of the evidence, but less so than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. 
 226. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
 227. Id.  The Court defined “medically appropriate” as, “in the patient’s best medical interest 
in light of his medical condition.”  Id. 
 228. Pat DeLeon, Ph.D., Professional Maturation The Judicial Arena, THE INDEPENDENT 
PRACTITIONER: BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS IN INDEPENDENT PRACTICE (Fall 2003), at 
http://www.division42.org/MembersArea/IPfiles/IPFall03/advocacy/maturation.html.  Also, the 
court should consider the exact medication that the government determines it will use, and not make 
assumptions that a medication used effectively for one disorder will work to alleviate the symptoms 
of another.  Id.  According to Dr. DeLeon, “Many mental disorders that bear some resemblance to 
one another respond very differently to medication.  A court would not be justified in ordering that a 
defendant with one psychotic disorder be treated with antipsychotic drugs solely because those 
drugs benefit patients with a different disorder.”  Id.  According to the 8th Circuit opinion in Sell, 
medication is medically appropriate if: (1) it is likely to render the patient competent . . . ; (2) the 
likelihood and gravity of side effects do not overwhelm its benefits . . . ; and (3) it is in the best 
medical interests of the patient.”  United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 229. Sell, 282 F.3d at 568-69.  Two government doctors testified that antipsychotic medication 
was the only way Dr. Sell’s delusional disorder could be contained.  Id. at 569.  But see Nance, 
supra note 165, at 713.  Dr. Sell produced a report from Dr. Greenstein, of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, stating that delusional disorders “do not typically respond to medication or psychotherapy.”  
Sell, 282 F.3d at 570.  Another psychologist testified that “there is no evidence that antipsychotic 
medications are beneficial for patients with Delusional Disorder.”  Id. at 569.  Finally, a textbook 
published by the American Psychiatric Association “notes that there is a disagreement between 
experts on the effectiveness of treating delusional disorders with antipsychotic medications . . . .”  
Id. at 569-70.  In addition, the doctors who testified for the government did not experience any real 
success in medicating the disease.  Nance, supra note 165, at 713.  “Only three out of four such 
patients regained any level of competency, and Wolfson acknowledged that the medical literature 
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medication the government would administer to Dr. Sell.230 
Thus, a review of the medical evidence reveals that: (1) the medical 
literature would place Dr. Sell’s prospects for restored competency at 50 
percent, at best; and (2) only one of the State’s two testifying doctors 
had any relevant success restoring competency of any note in patients 
similar to Sell, and that success was based on a miniscule sample of four 
treated individuals.231 
C.  The Effect of Sell v. United States on Dr. Sell and Other Mentally Ill 
Defendants 
This case has more significance than just to Dr. Sell, as it may have 
an effect on any mentally ill person accused of a crime who might still 
be drugged in order to stand trial.232  The “mental autonomy” of every 
citizen is also in jeopardy.233  Sell has left lower courts with a test that 
seems to instruct them on forcible medication, yet ignores many of a 
non-dangerous defendant’s constitutional rights.234 
Changes in the kinds of antipsychotic medications available for the 
treatment of mental illness may also make it easier for the government to 
satisfy parts of the test laid out in Sell.235  This is problematic because 
antipsychotic medication’s side-effects were a strong reason the 
 
indicates that delusional patients respond less to medication than do patients with other forms of 
mental illness.”  Id. at 714. 
 230. Sell, 282 F.3d at 570 n.14.  One of the government’s experts, Dr. Wolfson, would not 
specify exactly which drugs they would use to medicate Dr. Sell.  Id.  Accordingly, Dr. Sell could 
only make “generalized medical arguments against the State’s evidence.”  See Nance, supra note 
165, at 713. 
 231. Id. at 714. 
 232. Lypps, supra note 145, at http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/extra/sell-lypps.html. 
 233. Id.  In Sell, the court noted the importance of the applicable constitutional issues raised by 
the case, but only concentrated on the Fifth Amendment question of “whether the Court violated Dr. 
Sell’s right to due process of law?”  Id.  According to Lypps, CCLE attorney Julie Ruiz-Sierra put it 
this way: “they’re not exactly saying that there’s a constitutional right to avoid forced medication; 
they’re saying there is a right not to be forcibly medicated without due process.”  Id. 
 234. See Jonathan Groner, New Challenge Expected by Hill Shooter Ruling Could Reopen 
Question of Weston’s Forced Medication, LEGAL TIMES, June 23, 2003.  “Says Barbara Van Gelder 
of Wiley, Rein & Fielding, a former longtime assistant U.S. attorney: ‘The Sell case doesn’t answer 
any questions.  It just opens the door for continued wrangling with experts over what exactly is a 
side effect.  It could be years, under this standard, before anyone gets medicated.’”  Id. 
 235. Douglass Mossman, Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket”: The Legal Significance of 
Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 
1145 (2002) (discussing legal issues and policy problems involving the newer antipsychotic agents).  
“Advances in the primary antipsychotic medications and adjunct therapies make such side effects 
less likely.”  Id.  Medications that help control side effects are becoming more available, and these 
antipsychotic medications are going to make a defendant’s affect more appropriate.  Id. 
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government was unable to meet the standard in Sell.236  If newer 
medications create a greater possibility for the government to satisfy the 
test, the serious constitutional issues passed over by the Sell Court will 
be violated. 
This problem is important for cases such as Gomes v. United 
States,237 in which Gomes was charged with possession of a firearm.238  
In that case, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further 
consideration in light of Sell.239  Because of the indeterminate nature and 
weak scrutiny in the test from Sell, Gomes, another non-dangerous 
defendant, will be forced to suffer through his trial in a medicated 
state.240  The court made its decision in the following passage from the 
 
 236. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185-86. 
 237. Gomes, 539 U.S. 939 (2003) (Second Circuit decision vacated and the case remanded for 
reconsideration in light of the Sell decision).  Gomes was charged with possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2002), vacated by 539 U.S. 939 
(2003).  After he was found incompetent to stand trial, the United States District Court ordered 
involuntary medication to render him fit to stand trial.  Id. at 78. Gomes subsequently appealed the 
court’s decision.  Id. 
 238. Id. at 75.  A forensic psychologist offered testimony on behalf of the government that 
Gomes suffered from an undefined psychotic disorder characterized by delusions of conspiracies 
and a lack of understanding of the proceedings pending against him.  Id. at 76. 
 239. Gomes v. United States, 539 U.S. 939 (2003).  See also Deborah F. Buckman, Validity, 
Construction, and Operation of Protection and Advocacy For Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 10801 et seq., 191 A.L.R. FED. 205 (2004). 
The judgment in [United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002), was vacated and 
remanded by the Supreme Court in Gomes v. United States, 539 U.S. 939 (2003), in 
light of Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)], a case not involving the Protection 
and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 10801 et seq., in which 
the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause permits the 
government to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant 
facing serious criminal charges to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only 
if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that 
may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, 
is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. On 
remand of the Gomes case to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that court in 
[United States v. Gomes, 69 Fed. Appx. 36 (2d Cir. 2003)], in turn ordered that the case 
be remanded to the District Court for the District of Connecticut for reconsideration and 
application of the standards for involuntary medication to render a defendant competent 
to stand trial set forth in the Sell case. 
Id. 
 240. United States v. Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158, 169 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that Gomes 
may be involuntarily medicated).  Other recent cases have also applied the Sell factors in 
involuntary medication decisions.  For example, see United States v. Morris, No. CR.A.95-50-SLR, 
2005 WL 348306, *6 (D.Del. Feb. 8, 2005).  In Morris, the court held: 
After due consideration of the evidence and application of that evidence under the Sell 
analysis, the court finds that the government has met is burden and concludes that 
involuntary medical, psychological and psychiatric treatment, including the 
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remand: 
Having considered the Sell factors and Mr. Gomes’s current 
competency to stand trial, the Court concludes that Mr. Gomes 
may be involuntarily medicated.  In light of the application of 
the Sell factors, including the efficacy, the side effects, the 
possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of anti-
psychotic drug treatment, the Government has shown by clear 
and convincing evidence a need for drug treatment sufficiently 
important to overcome Mr. Gomes's liberty interest in refusing 
it.241   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court correctly decided to hear the appeal of Dr. Sell 
on the issue of forced medication.  Few rights are more precious than 
those included within the right to privacy.  It is imperative that our 
courts make sure that mentally ill patients are treated in a most fair and 
constitutional manner throughout the judicial process. 
Substantively, the Court should have applied strict scrutiny to 
forced medication criminal cases.  When strong constitutional issues 
such as freedom to think, right to privacy, and right to a fair trial are all 
implicated, it is not enough for the Court to apply a heightened scrutiny 
test.  Although the government has a strong interest in prosecution of 
criminal defendants, the individual has a stronger interest in protecting 
his individual liberty.  Judge Bye of the Eighth Circuit aptly said: 
Unlike the majority, I would apply the strict scrutiny standard of 
review for the reasons enunciated by the Sixth Circuit in United 
States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 956-61 (6th Cir. 1998). But 
even under the majority’s three-part test, the charges against Dr. 
Sell are not sufficiently serious to forcibly inject him with 
antipsychotic drugs on the chance it will make him competent to 
stand trial. . . .  However, the government’s interest in forcing 
 
administration of antipsychotic medication for Stanley Morris should occur.  The court 
further finds that the treatment proposed by Dr. Herbel at Butner is consistent with the 
second through fourth prongs under Sell.  The court does not make this decision lightly 
and notes the efforts by counsel for the government and Morris to assure that the Sell 
factors were met. 
Id.   
     241.   Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 169.  See also id., 163-67 for the court’s detailed application of 
the Sell factors.  The court goes through an extensive analysis of the Sell test in determining that 
Gomes should be medicated to stand trial.  The remand decision was subsequently affirmed by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  See United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 2004), 
for more information on the appeal. 
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him to stand trial on charges that may result in such limited 
punishment does not outweigh his substantial rights under the 
First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments.242 
For now, Sell is a good start towards protecting a non-dangerous, 
mentally ill defendant’s rights, but it just does not go far enough.  
Hopefully the Supreme Court will have the opportunity in the future to 
align its views with a higher standard for forced medication, such as the 
one Judge Bye recommended. 
Elizabeth G. Schultz 
 
 242. Sell, 282 F.3d at 572 (Bye, J., dissenting).  See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 
956-61 (6th Cir. 1998) (enumerating an individual’s rights in refusing antipsychotic medication). 
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